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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (13 May 69) FOR OT UT 691257

21 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-T (NHD)

19 February 1969

SUBJ/LCT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL), (U)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during the reporting period, continued in the performance of its general missions.

(a) Destruction of main force VC/AVA forces, equipment, and base camps.

(b) In conjunction with GVN forces, the identification and destruction of local force VC and infrastructure in order to provide a secure environment to further GVN control over the area and people.

(c) Overwatch of the TAOI.

(d) Assistance in the training and improvement of GVN forces.

(e) Area preparation (Destruction and Construction).

(2) The basic essential missions assigned by XI Field Force, Vietnam, in conjunction with Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) remain applicable to this reporting period. They are: protection of Saigon, protection of main routes of communication with the Division TAOI, and the defeat of enemy plans. In addition, the Division has assumed important missions associated with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign which commenced on 1 Nov 68 and is scheduled for completion 17 Feb 69. This campaign is described in detail in other portions of this report.

(3) The operational trends of the period, based on command guidance, experience factors, and the changing tactical environment, have undergone a slight adjustment since the close of the previous period. The current trends are:

(a) Night operations.

(b) Maintain contact.

(c) Small unit operations.

(d) "Pile-on" tactics.

(e) Thorough search.

(f) B-52 exploitation.

b. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

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(a) Strength	OFF	WO	M	AGG
Authorized 1 Nov 68	1042	171	15366	16579
Authorized 31 Jan 69	1071	181	15720	16972
Assigned 1 Nov 68	1072	167	15534	16773
Assigned 31 Jan 69	1139	166	16291	17596

(b) Gains, qualifications and status:

1. Enlisted:

a. Replacements received: 4000

b. Outstanding requisitions: Sr Enl Grades: 11B40 (18), 11C40 (5),  
11D40 (2), 11F50 (4), 11G50 (3), 12B40 (1), 12Z50 (2), 13B40 (2), 13E40 (1),  
13Z50 (1), 63C40 (1), 63Z50 (1), 67Z50 (1), 76Y40 (1), 91B40 (2), 94B40 (7).  
95B50 (1), 96B50 (1); E6 and below: (Nov 279, Dec 101, Jan 233) due to short-  
fall total: 663.

c. Credits: None.

d. Qualifications: None

2. Officer:

a. Replacements received: 396

b. Outstanding requisitions: 0

c. Credits: Ample replacements were received for losses, however, a  
shortage of Captains still exist in combat arms particularly Infantry.

d. Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fill being received for  
requested Captain requirements in combat arms.

(c) Losses:

1. Enlisted: There were 3626 losses during the quarter due to reassi-  
gnment within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board action.

2. Officers: There were 304 losses during the quarter due to reassi-  
gnment within Vietnam, rotations, ETS, and board action.

(d) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

1. Nov:	OFF	WO	M	AGG
KHA	5	1	1	77
WHA	25	0	31	374
MHA	0	0	1	1
NBD	0	1	1	2
NBM	1	0	47	48
2. Dec:				
KHA	0	0	29	29
WHA	8	0	240	248
MHA	0	0	7	7
NBM	4	1	54	59
3. Jan:				
KHA	4	0	36	40
WHA	15	0	280	295
MHA	0	0	3	3
NBD	0	0	30	30

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## (e) Maintenance of Morale:

## 1. Awards and Decorations:

Medal of Honor	1
Distinguished Service Cross	4
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Legion of Merit	6
Silver Star	139
Distinguished Flying Cross	27
Soldier's Medal	41
Air Medal Valor	24
Air Medal Merit	1674
Bronze Star Valor	589
Bronze Star Merit	1358
Army Commendation Medal Valor	404
Army Commendation Medal Merit	1874
Purple Heart	947
Certificate of Achievement	11
TOTAL	6998

2. On 10 December 1968, the 1st Infantry Division received the Vietnamese Gallantry Cross with Palm. The unit was given the award for heroic actions and valorous achievements during the period 12 July 1965 through 22 October 1968.

## (2) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) There were 19 serious incidents and 47 AWOLs reported to the PM during the period and 19 apprehended.

(b) There was 7 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 158 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 20 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

(3) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 150 remains processed and evacuated.

## (4) Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1923 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 57,336.

(b) During the quarter 3917 out-of-country R&R allocations were utilized.

## (5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the division employed approximately 600 temporary hire local nationals on a daily basis.

(b) There were 982 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

## c. (C) Operations.

(1) General: The 1st Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory), Phase II, which commenced 312/00 May 68. All organic units and those OPCON to the Division are involved. Tactics have consisted of both unilateral and combined reconnaissance-in-force and night ambush operations designed to deny VC base area utilization, interdict infiltration, and disrupt logistical activity. Ground and air reconnaissance efforts in the Ben Hoa-Saigon Rocket Belt continued to hamper VC/NVA mortar and rocket activity in that area. Extensi... land clearing

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operations have been conducted throughout the period in the Catcher's Mitt area, the area east of Lai Khe, and along Route 1A from Phuc Vinh to Dong Xoai. Route security operations continued along Highway 13. Overwatch of US Special Forces activities continued as a responsibility until the early Nov 68 boundary adjustments occurring with the arrival of the 1st Cav Div (A) (see para 1c (4) (a)). Responsibility for Overwatch of ARVN activities and Vietnamese Government installations in the Division's adjusted TAOI continues through this reporting period. Pacification missions assigned in conjunction with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, a GVN effort toward accelerated improvement of territorial security and elimination of the VC Infrastructure, continue through the period.

(2) Force Disposition: (a) Major adjustments in force disposition occurred during the period 1-10 Nov 68 with the major realignment of areas of operations for the 1st and 3d Bde and 11th ACR (see para 1c (4) (b)).

(b) During early Nov 68 the 1st Bde provided two to three infantry battalions to operations vic Tong Le Chon and during late Nov 68 one to two infantry battalions to operations in the Trapezoid. During Dec 68 and the first half of Jan 69 the 1st Bde provided one to three infantry battalions for varying periods to operations east of the Michelin Plantation, north and west of Phuc Vinh, and east of Chon Thanh. In late Jan 69 responsibility was assumed for Song Be road operations to which one infantry battalion and one cavalry troop were normally committed.

(c) The 2d Bde generally employed one infantry battalion in the Thu Duc/Lai Thieu area for installation security, one cavalry squadron in the Di An/Phu Loi area for population control and rice denial operations, and one infantry battalion along the Phu Loi interdiction line.

(d) The 3d Bde generally employed one infantry battalion in the vicinity of Lai Khe for conduct of operations in north and central Lam Son areas. One to two battalions were provided for joint operations with ARVN in the Trapezoid in Dec 68. Extensive pacification operations vic An Gien/Chanh Luu and combined operations in the area for purpose of rice denial and VCI neutralization required an infantry battalion in Jan 69. Security along Hwy 13 was provided by an infantry company (-) and a mechanized infantry platoon and armor platoon.

(e) The 11th ACR generally provided two cavalry squadrons to combined operations with ARVN and civic action/psychological operations in the eastern Lam Son/Catcher's Mitt area.

(f) Inclosure 3 provides a detailed description of force disposition unit.

(3) Land Clearing Operations: (a) During the reporting period the 1st Engineer Battalion Rome Plows cleared a total of 2,304 acres in the Division TAOI. The Rome Plow team normally consisted of 5 Rome Plows, 4 tanks, 1 APC, and 25 men.

(b) The 60th Land Clearing Company of the 20th Engineer Brigade supported the 1st Division throughout the period. The 60th LCC cut a total of 15,511 acres in three principle areas: Catcher's Mitt, Lai Khe East, and along Route 1A from Phuc Vinh to Dong Xoai.

(c) On 15 Jan 1969, 60th Land Clearing Company commenced operation Van Thang 2-64. Phase I mission was to establish an engineer Coordination Center and, with other elements of the Division, the 60th LCC commenced clearing a strip 200 meters east and west of Route 1A from Phuc Vinh to Dong Xoai.

1. Purpose of mission was to deny the enemy the use of ambush locations and to upgrade route LTL 1A. Bridges and roads were to be upgraded

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by 301st Engineer Combat Battalion (ARVN).

2. Progress to date:

a. A 200 meter swath has been cleared from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai, completed 3 Feb 69.

b. Road upgrading by 301st (ARVN) Engrs is at present 95% complete. Minor work remains to be done on several culverts and the causeway.

c. Mining incidents during this period were slight. Only 8 mines were encountered on the route from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai.

d. A total of 3,000 acres were cleared, two culverts were installed along the route, and one causeway was installed.

(4) Operation Toan Thang, Phase II: (a) At the close of the previous period the multi-battalion operation vicinity of Tong Le Chon continued.

1. On 30 Oct, in the previous reporting period, the 2-28 Inf was replaced at FSPB Julie by the 1-2 Inf. On 31 Oct while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations vic of FSPB Julie elements of the 1-2 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force vic AT514892. The contact was supported by light fire teams, artillery, and tactical airstrikes and broke shortly thereafter. At 1400 hours contact was regained with an estimated platoon sized enemy element. Again supported by light fire teams and artillery, this contact broke at 1530 hours. Cumulative US casualties for the engagements were 5 US WIA while 25 VC were killed by the 1-2 Inf elements and another 17 killed by airstrikes.

2. On 1 Nov at 1530 hours the 2-28 was reinserted into the Tong Le Chon area to conduct operations out of FSPB Rita.

3. Throughout 1 Nov FSPB Rita was subjected to intense shelling by enemy forces with RPG, mortar, and rocket fire along with several ground probes. The artillery at the FSPB was used in a direct fire role against the enemy ground attacks. Artillery, light fire teams, and tactical airstrikes supported throughout the day. In addition to the 2-28 Inf, B Trp/1-4 Cav (-) was located at this time at the FSPB along with previously listed units. Total US casualties for all elements included 12 KIA and 54 WIA while 5 ACAVs and 2 155 howitzers were also heavily damaged. The enemy body count for the action was 27 VC KIA.

4. Sporadic contact continued around FSPBs Rita, Julie, and Dot until 8 Nov. On that date FSPB Julie was disestablished by the 1-2 Inf. On 9 Nov the 2-28 Inf disestablished positions at FSPB Rita. On 10 Nov the 1-2 Inf was replaced in FSPB Dot by the 36 Rangers (ARVN) thus ending major 1st Division participation in activity in this area.

(b) Another event of major operational significance occurred in early Nov 68 with the arrival of the 1st Cav Div (AM) into the III CTZ. The relocation of that unit into what was formerly the northern portion of the 1st Inf Div TAOI caused major adjustment of unit locations and AOs. At Incls 13 is the movement schedule which reflects the concept for relocation of units. At Incls 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 are overlays reflecting boundary changes caused by the action and new AOs for 1st and 2d Brigades. 1st Inf Div. Major moves and adjustments had been completed by 10 Nov 68.

(c) Enemy activity in both old and new Division TAOI remained at low to moderate levels during the majority of Nov 68. Activity could be described as consisting of small scattered contacts with few indications of a planned major effort by enemy forces.

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1. On 5 Nov at approximately 1315 hours, C Trp/1-4 Cav, while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations vic XT9191C1 encountered and engaged an unknown size enemy force with contact breaking at 1330 hours. A later search of the area revealed 3 VC KIA, 1 SKS rifle, 1 unserviceable 20mm AA weapon (Complete), and miscellaneous documents and munitions. There were 2 US slightly wounded in this brief but profitable encounter.

2. On 6 Nov the 3-11 ACR, while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Central Lam Son area vic XT847242 in conjunction with local RF/PF forces, captured 4 VC in a tunnel complex. Later in the afternoon another 2 VC PWs were apprehended along with 2 detainees. In addition 2 VC were killed in the engagements.

3. Another small but successful engagement occurred on 7 Nov when the 2-28 Inf, while conducting security operations near Thu Duc, engaged a small enemy force resulting in 3 VC KIA, capture of 3 AK 47's, 1 Mi6, 1 12 gauge shotgun, 1 unknown type automatic weapon, 2 CHICOM pistols, miscellaneous munitions and documents.

4. On the same day the 1-4 Cav (-), in a village seal of Ap Dua vic XT873124 with Binh Duong PF, apprehended 25 detainees and captured 2 VC PWs, 3 AK 47's, and 1 CHICOM pistol. Two Chieu Hoi were also accepted.

5. In a significant engagement at 1430 hours, 8 Nov, B Trp/1-11 Cav with a platoon from B Trp/2-34 Arm engaged a reinforced VC company vic XT705845. In reoccurring contacts throughout the afternoon enemy forces suffered 22 NVA KIA and 30 NVA KIA (possible). Captured equipment included 2 AK 47's, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 RPG-7 launcher, 30 lbs of NVA web gear, and a sizable amount of munitions and documents.

6. Still on 8 Nov, a village seal of Chanh Luu by B Co/1-14 Inf, B Co/2-2 Inf (M), and I Trp/3-11 Cav along with 3-8 ARVN and 2-1 ARVN Cav resulted in 2 VC KIA, 21 detainees apprehended, 8 VC PWs, and capture of 5 individual weapons and miscellaneous munitions.

7. On 9 Nov vic XT830303 L Trp/3-11 Cav located a weapons cache containing 3 SKS rifles, 2 M1 carbines, and 1 Thompson sub-machine gun.

8. On 9 Nov in a small and brief encounter, the 2-2 Inf, while conducting Rong Plow security operations in AO Mustang, engaged several VC vic YN098320 resulting in 3 VC KIA and 3 AK 47's captured.

9. On 10 Nov B Trp/1-11 Cav was conducting operations west of An Loc in association with previously mentioned activities vic Tong Le Chon. In the late afternoon vic XT677862 the unit engaged an unknown size enemy force in a fierce one hour battle resulting in 22 NVA KIA. There were 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA in the engagement along with the destruction of 1 tank and 1 ACAV. The following day, 11 Nov, contact continued vic XT684365 resulting in 1 US KIA and 23 NVA KIA and 1 NVA KBA. Six RTG launchers and 1 AK 47 were captured.

10. Still on 10 Nov, a night ambush by B Co/2-18 proved highly successful. At XS949963 approximately 25 VC were permitted to fall the killing zone and were engaged resulting in 6 VC KIA and 3 AK 47's, 1 M1 carbine, and 1 CHICOM pistol captured. There were no friendly losses.

11. On 13 Nov the 1-26 Inf, after conducting an air assault into field positions west of Phouc Vinh, commenced reconnaissance-in-force operations in the area. In early afternoon, D Co/1-26 Inf was engaged in heavy contact with what was initially estimated as an enemy platoon. The engagement vic XT867467 was reinforced by additional elements of the battalion. The four hour battle resulted in 5 US KIA and 22 US WIA. A later

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sweep of base camp in which the contact occurred did not locate a confirmed enemy body count.

12. With the aid of a Chieu Hoi, M Trp/3-11 Cav discovered on 13 Nov vic XT915297 a small weapons cache containing 1 M79, 1 M2 carbine, and 3 M1 rifles.

13. On 14 and 15 Nov air activity accounted for a significant number of enemy casualties. On 14 Nov in the late afternoon a D Trp/1-4 Cav light fire team engaged 12 VC in the open approximately 10 Km NW of Lai Khe resulting in 8 VC KIA. Again on 15 Nov vic XT677350 a D Trp/1-4 Cav Hunter-Killer team engaged an unknown size VC force in a base camp resulting in 11 VC KIA. Supporting artillery fire was credited with an additional 5 VC KIA. Later sweeps of the base camp complex by A Co/1-28 Inf and C Co/1-16 Inf located 150 100 lb bags of rice and 1 individual weapon.

14. Significant caches were located by 2-28 Inf on 15 Nov in the area of XT927627. Initially 2500 lbs of rice was uncovered. More extensive searching resulted in discovery of 92 Bangalore torpedoes, 990 CHICOM grenades, 60 CHICOM claymores, 750 4 lb blocks TNT, 900 82mm rds, 1 50 lb AT mine, 1 RPG launcher, 10 boxes MG links, 4 boxes LMG parts, 13 pr CHICOM binoculars, 1 tripod mount for an AA weapon, and assorted heavy MG parts.

15. Ambush patrol activity from A Co/1-28 Inf was moderately heavy on 16 Nov. In the first of two engagements an enemy platoon was engaged vic XT672340 resulting in 3 VC KIA and capture of 1 AK 50, 1 60mm mortar with base plate, and miscellaneous munitions and equipment. There were 2 US KIA and 8 US WIA in this initial contact. Later in the evening another patrol from the company engaged a platoon vic XT692341 resulting in 3 VC KIA and capture of 1 CHICOM LMG and 1 RPG-2 launcher.

16. A small but profitable contact occurred with B Trp/1-4 Cav on 19 Nov when, while destroying a tunnel cor x vic XT958087, 4 VC were engaged and killed and 1 AK 47 and 1 US cal .45 pistol were captured.

(d) Although overall activity throughout the TNAI remained at a tempo in the later half of Nov comparable with the first half, there were scattered incidents of intense combat.

1. On 20 Nov, FSPB Cantigny vic XT651335 in the Trapezoid area was subjected to a heavy indirect fire and ground attack at approximately 0400 hours by an estimated company of VC. The FSPB was occupied by 2-28 Inf. The attacks, launched from the west and southwest sides of the perimeter, were repulsed by the forces within the FSPB with assistance from light fire teams, artillery, and Air Force flare and mini-gun aircraft. The two hour engagement resulted in 4 US KIA and 16 US WIA while a sweep of the area of contact located 13 NVA KIA, 1 NVA PW, 10 AK 47 rifles, 1 CHICOM carbine, 1 9mm French rifle, and 3 CHICOM LMGs.

2. On 21 Nov a Long Range Patrol, upon its insertion vic XT639441, was engaged by an estimated VC platoon while moving off the landing zone. At approximately the same moment one of the lift ships which had performed the insertion received heavy ground fire as it was departing the area. The 6 man patrol suffered 5 US KIA and 1 US WIA who evaded the enemy force and was later recovered. D Co/2-28 was inserted into the area of contact, recovered the US killed, and engaged and killed 2 VC in vicinity of the contact area.

3. On 21 Nov B Co/1-16 Inf, while conducting night patrol operations vic XT817346, engaged an estimated VC platoon in approximately a one hour contact resulting in 3 VC KIA with capture of 2 AK 47s, 1 60mm mortar, and miscellaneous equipment, munitions, and documents.

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4. On 22 Nov C Trp/1-4 Cav, while searching a tunnel complex vic XT828-267 with Chan Thanh PRU elements, engaged and killed 3 VC and captured 1 AK 47 rifle and 1 US cal .45 pistol.

5. On the same day the Aero Rifle Platoon of the 11th ACR engaged a small force in a bunker complex vic XT992365 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 4 VC KIA (possible). A total of 6 AK 47 rifles were located in a subsequent area search.

6. On 24 Nov the 2-2 Inf (-) (A) was placed under OPCON of the 1st Cav Div (A) and moved overland from Lai Khe to An Loc to commence missions assigned by that unit. The unit returned to Lai Khe briefly on 7 Dec for a maintenance standdown and was again placed under OPCON of 1st Cav Div (A) on 9 Dec. The unit remains in that status as of the close of the reporting period.

7. Joint operations by L Trp/3-11 Cav with 51st Rangers on 27 Nov resulted in a successful engagement on 27 Nov in northwestern Catcher's Mitt area. In a brief but intense fire fight the enemy suffered 6 KIA and capture of 2 carbines, 3 AK 47 rifles, and 50 lbs of documents.

8. On 28 Nov Recon and Co C/2-16 Inf and platoons from A and C Trp/1-4 Cav were conducting joint rice denial, population control, and VCI neutralization operations with Chan Thanh RF units vic Phu Loi. In an early 0150 hours contact Recon/2-16 Inf engaged 4 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and 1 AK 47 rifle captured. A joint seal of the village of Cau Dat vic XT840270 later in the morning resulted in 2 VC KIA and 3 VC PWs.

9. On 30 Nov C Co/1-26 Inf, while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations southeast of the Michelin, located a base camp vic XT629460 containing 4 SKS rifles, 5 9mm sub-machine guns, and a sizeable amount of munitions and clothing.

10. Also on 30 Nov a B-52 bomb damage assessment mission by the Aero Rifle Platoon/11th ACR proved extremely successful. Inserting vic YT086-312 after the airstrike, the platoon discovered 12 VC KIA, 4 AK 47 rifles, 3 SKS carbines, 1 unknown type bolt action rifle, 10 CHICOM grenades, 51 60mm mortar rounds, and 8 lbs of documents in the target area.

(e) Activity in the 1st Division TAOI remained, for the greatest part, light and sporadic throughout the month of December. This of course was partially attributable to the change in TAOI boundaries occurring in mid-November. Operations continued to be characterized by reconnaissance-in-force and night ambush patrols. Pacification operations continued to assume increasing importance, and requirements for assets for this activity increased. The attack on FSPB Junction City highlighted combat activity in December.

1. On 1 Dec the 11th ACR, along with elements of B Co/1-18 Inf, were involved in another series of highly successful contacts. The Aero Rifle Platoon while conducting ground operations and B-52 bomb damage assessment missions vic YT088317 and XT998385 engaged a total of 14 VC in 4 separate contacts throughout the afternoon killing the total 14 enemy without suffering friendly casualties. In addition 5 VC killed by airstrikes were found. In mid-afternoon the ARPs were reinforced by B Co/1-18 Inf (-) and this unit suffered 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA while being credited with 8 VC KIA during the afternoon contacts.

2. On 2 Dec the ARPs again were inserted in the vicinity of the previous day's contacts following a napalm strike on suspected enemy locations. They located 10 NVA KIA, 6 AK 47s, 1 M16, 2 CHICOM radios with back packs, 1 CHICOM field phone, 2 head/chest sets for the radios, and miscellaneous documents.

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3. In a 2 Dec sweep of their area of contact, the 1-18 Inf located an additional 6 VC KIA, 2 AK 47s, 1 pair of binoculars, and miscellaneous munitions.

4. On the evening of 1 Dec 68 the 2-28 Inf, while operating out of FSPE Junction City vic XT620328, was subjected to a heavy indirect fire and ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. The attack commenced at 0300 hours and was repulsed at approximately 0430 hours with the neutralization of the enemy who had succeeded in penetrating the perimeter. Total results for the action were 1 US KIA and 36 US WIA of which 16 were evacuated while subsequent area search located 44 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC PWs, 1 pr binoculars, 4 LMGs, 7 RPG launchers, and 21 AK 47s.

5. On the evening of 3 Dec a highly successful ambush patrol from Co B/1-16 Inf (Mech) engaged two separate groups of VC approximately 20 minutes apart in the same ambush site. The contacts resulted in 1 US WIA with 6 VC KIA, 1 VC PW, 4 small arms captured along with miscellaneous munitions and documents.

6. On the same evening in a separate action in a village seal of An Dien vic XT730320, Co C/1-16 Inf (M) observed 6 to 8 VC attempting to breach the seal. When sighted, the VC returned to the village and the friendly elements began to receive fire from the south end of the village. Fire was returned by the sealing forces and an early morning search located 4 VC KIA, 3 AK 47s, 1 SKS rifle, 2 RPG launchers, an unidentified small arm, and miscellaneous documents and munitions.

7. On 8 Dec the 1-2 Inf, while conducting B-52 bomb damage assessment missions in the Catcher's Mitt, engaged enemy forces throughout the day with significant results. During late evening of 7 Dec a Co D/1-2 Inf ambush patrol engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 AK 47 captured. A short distance from this location at XT975382, Co C/1-2 Inf, during a morning sweep operation located 800 lbs of rice, 1 M-60 MG, 200 rds ammo, 1 US BAR, 1 CHICOM grenade, 1 RPG rd, and 1 bag of explosive powder. Later Co B/1-2 Inf located and destroyed a 55 gal drum of CS gas. Co C/1-2 Inf in two small engagements during morning sweeps suffered 1 US WIA. Late in the afternoon Co B located in graves 6 VC bodies which appeared to be a result of the B-52 strikes. And in late afternoon at 1715 hours vic XT955-378 Co B/1-2 Inf, in a short 10 minute contact supported by tactical air and artillery, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 18 VC KIA and 9 VC KIA (possible). There were 1 US killed and 3 wounded in the brief contact.

8. On 9 Dec Co D/1-2 Inf located vic XT972403 a sizeable arms cache containing 16 assorted individual weapons, 1 sewing machine, and miscellaneous medical and dental equipment.

9. On 9 Dec the Aero Rifle Platoon/1-4 Cav, while conducting operations vic XT849545, located a cache containing 6 SKS carbines, 250 rounds of Link 30 cal ammunition and miscellaneous documents.

10. On 10 Dec vic XT843268 another sizeable cache was uncovered by C Co 2-16 Inf. It contained 17 82mm mortar rds, 9 RPG rds, 50 gren, 10 claymore mines, 2 US carbines, 2 CHICOM carbines, and 2 RPG boosters.

11. On 10 Dec H Trp/2-11 ACR, while conducting night patrol operations in the northern Catcher's Mitt, engaged 10 VC who attempted to flee immediately. A search of the area of contact located 3 VC KIA, 2 AK 47s, 2 CHICOM type 56 LMGs, 4 RPG-7 rds, 2 RPG-7 boosters, 2 CHICOM claymores, 4 handgrenade gren, 100 lbs rice, 400 rds MG ammo, 5000 rds AK 47 ammo, and miscellaneous documents and clothing.

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12. On 15 Dec while conducting B-52 bomb damage assessment missions vic XT958415, D Co/1-28 Inf located 12 VC bodies and miscellaneous documents and munitions.

13. On 17 Dec, while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations vic XT944090, A Co/1-2 Inf uncovered a cache containing 1 RPG LMG, 5 SKS rifles, 7 bolt action rifles, and 50 lbs of assorted demolitions and small arms ammunition.

14. On 19 Dec, while conducting bomb damage assessment missions in locations east of the Song Be, the 1-2 Inf (-) established contact with an unknown size enemy force vic XT923621. The brief engagement resulted in 5 US WIA and 1 VC KIA. The friendly unit located in the area of the contact a significant cache containing 26 9mm pistols, 3 AK 47 rifles, 1 SKS rifle, 1 unknown type sniper rifle, 1 unknown type carbine, 4 RPG-7 launchers, 3 RPG-7 sights, 19 9mm pistol holsters, 30 ammo pouches, 2 82mm mortar sights, 2 60mm mortar base plates, 4 mortar aiming stakes, 2 bicycles, and miscellaneous clothing, documents, and munitions. In addition, the unit discovered 3 VC bodies resulting from the B-52 strikes.

15. Again on 2G Dec a sizeable cache was uncovered by Co D/1-2 Inf vic XT923621. It contained 1 M1 carbine, 8 AK 47 rifles, 180 AK 47 magazines, 300 lbs rice, 6 bicycles, 1 pair of binoculars, and miscellaneous documents.

16. On 22 Dec while conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions near a 15 Dec B-52 strike target vic XT941419, H Trp/2-11 Cav discovered 1 VC KIA, 1 82mm mortar tube and base plate, 34 82mm mortar rounds, 13 RPG-7 rounds, 1 SKS rifle, 1 BAR, 1 SMG, 1 M1 carbine, and miscellaneous munitions.

17. On the evening of 24 Dec an element of the 2-28 Inf (-) participated in a highly successful ambush vic XT638325. The C Co/2-28 Inf unit engaged an unknown size enemy force in its killing zone with a later area search locating 7 VC KIA, 1 AK 47 rifle, 2 9mm pistols, and 1 RPG launcher.

18. On 24 Dec at 1800 hours the Division commenced observation of the Christmas cease fire. Normal combat operations were resumed at 1800 hours, 25 Dec.

19. In another ambush action on 26 Dec, B Trp/1-11 Cav vicinity XT903-307 successfully engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC killed and 1 wounded VC captured. Two individual weapons were captured.

20. During conduct of reconnaissance-in-force operations in northwestern portions of the Catcher's Mitt, E Trp/2-11 engaged a sizeable VC force on 30 Dec. The engagement was initiated when a light observation helicopter received small arms fire from the ground and was forced to land. E Trp, securing the aircraft, was engaged by the enemy force and the Aero Rifle Platoon and two tanks moved to reinforce. The cumulative results of the two hour contact were 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA with 14 VC KIA and 5 VC PWS. One RPG launcher and 4 AK 47s were captured.

(f) Operation Lam Son 68, an operation involving indirect support of the Government of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development Program, was initiated by the 1st Division on Feb 68 and suspended 10 March 68. Suspension allowed for the future resumption if desired. The operation was officially terminated on 31 Dec 68. Cumulative results of Operation Lam Son 68 were listed in paragraph 1. c. 5 (j) Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68.

(g) During the month of Jan 69 the 1st Division experienced one of its least active months for some period in terms of enemy activity. For the greatest part, contacts involved small groups of enemy (3-8 VC). The enemy appeared to have concentrated his efforts in reconnaissance and logistics.

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activities throughout the month and avoided major contact. During the month there were 168 enemy KIA and 22 PWs. Of the 168 enemy KIA, a total of 71 were credited to the 2-2 Inf (M) for that time during which it was OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM). The above totals do not include data for the 11th ACR. The reduced level of activity is obvious in these totals.

1. In a brief action during the evening of 1 Jan near FSPB Junction City, elements of 2-28 Inf engaged an estimated 20 man enemy force which did not return fire. A search of the area of contact located 4 VC KIA and a small amount of equipment.

2. On 2 Jan the 1-16 Inf (M), while conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations vic XT688255, located a large tunnel complex and cache containing 2000 7.62 rounds, 3200 50 cal rounds, 84 82mm mortar rounds, 2700 lbs of rice, 1 M1 rifle, and a large amount of documents.

3. On 3 Jan the 1-2 Inf, while operating in the area near Phouc Vinh, experienced considerable activity during the day. During morning reconnaissance operations 4100 lbs of miscellaneous foodstuffs was located and sporadic contact maintained with light enemy resistance. In the late afternoon firm contact was established as C Co/1-2 Inf moved into an occupied enemy base camp and was engaged with heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket propelled grenade fire. In this one hour contact there were 3 US KIA and 25 US WIA. No confirmed enemy casualties could be determined.

4. On 3 Jan vic XT878258 the regimental command and control helicopter of the 11th ACR sighted and engaged 5 VC who attempted to evade. The Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted into the area immediately and located 1 VC KIA, 3 AK 47 rifles, and 1 RPG launcher. In addition 2 VC, one of whom was wounded, were captured. In conducting the search operation, a member of the ARV detonated a booby trapped claymore resulting in the wounding of 7 members of the unit.

5. On 4 Jan Recon/2-18 successfully exploited a captured VC in the Thu Duc area when the individual pointed out a tunnel complex vic XT895044. A total of 4 VC PWs and 4 AK 47s were taken in the initial search. When one of the newly captured PWs indicated that a number of enemy remained in the tunnel complex, the unit sealed the area until 5 Dec. Further tunnel clearing operations on this day resulted in an additional 7 VC PWs and 3 AK 47s and 1 M1 carbine captured.

6. On the same day F Trp/1-11 Cav conducted a very successful night ambush vic XT860312 against an 8 man VC force resulting in 7 VC KIA and 1 RPG launcher, 5 AK 47s, 1 CHICOM pistol, and miscellaneous equipment captured.

7. On 5 Jan D Co/1-2 Inf, on a reconnaissance-in-force mission north of Phouc Vinh, entered a bunker complex at XT929628 which proved to be occupied by an unknown size VC force. A large munitions cache was discovered during the course of sporadic contact in the base camp. The unit was forced to pull back from the area of contact after suffering 3 US WIA in order to place tactical airstrikes on the camp. Upon reentering the camp on 6 Jan the following cache was discovered: 146,880 small arms rounds, 276 82mm mortar rounds, 1020 lbs of C-4 explosive, 9 AP mines, 1 82mm mortar sight, and other miscellaneous equipment.

8. During the evening of 7 Jan an ambush patrol from Co B/1-26 Inf suffered moderate casualties when it was engaged vic XT589463 by an unknown size VC force. The brief fire fight resulted in 1 US KIA and 10 US WIA. There was 1 VC KIA.

9. On 8 Jan another ambush action by Co D/1-28 met with more successful results vic XT917432. There was 1 US WIA in the contact and a search of the

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ambush site located 3 VC KIA, 2 wounded VC PWs, 2 AK 47 rifles, 1 RPG launcher, 1 US cal .45 pistol, and items of individual VC gear. This action commenced as a squad size ambush and was reinforced by a platoon of ACAVs from C Trp/2-11 Cav.

10. One of the most successful village seals conducted in some time commenced on 11 Jan when elements of the 11th ACR cordoned and sealed the village of Tan Binh. The initial seal was completed at 0039 hours on 11 Jan and remained in effect until 1230 hours, 18 Jan. The duration of the seal is felt to have been influential in the outstanding results achieved. Participating units were 2/11 Cav, D Co/1-28 Inf and 3-8 ARVN. Results were as follows:

11 Jan 1 detainee, 1 pr US binoculars, and miscellaneous munitions  
12 Jan 3 detainees  
13 Jan 15 detainees, 1 50 cal MG, and miscellaneous munitions and equipment  
14 Jan 58 detainees, 3 AK 47s, and munitions  
15 Jan 14 detainees  
16 Jan 3 detainees  
17 Jan 6 detainees  
18 Jan 2 detainees

Based on interrogation, the above 102 detainees were later reclassified as follows:

30 VC ralliers  
4 VC PWs  
51 ralliers (considered militia or low level VC support personnel)  
6 VC suspects  
8 civil defendants  
3 innocent civilians

11. Early evening of 12 Jan saw another of the series of night ambushes successfully executed during this reporting period. At X06372 B Co/1-16 (M) sprung an ambush against 6 VC resulting in 5 VC KIA, 1 wounded PW, and 2 unknown type automatic weapons captured.

12. A significant contact was initiated by Co A/2-28 Inf on 13 Jan near Di An when an enemy force was encountered and engaged in a five minute fire fight. The engagement resulted in 1 US KIA and 8 US WIA. The area was sealed off by B Trp/1-4 Cav. Sporadic contact continued through the afternoon during which a light fire team on one occasion observed 20 secondary explosions from supporting fires. Final enemy losses were 3 VC KIA, 1 wounded VC captured, 3 AK 47 rifles and 1 RPG launcher captured.

13. On 15 Jan in a series of contacts throughout the day 4 to 6 Km southeast of the Michelin, the 1-26th Inf, in company sized reconnaissance-in-force missions, suffered 4 US KIA and 15 US WIA. Searches of various areas of contacts produced negative results. Contacts ranged from extremely

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short duration to approximately one half hour with enemy forces withdrawing from the area in each case.

14. Also on 15 Jan the 1-16 Inf (M) again achieved good ambush results as B Co engaged 4 VC in the early morning darkness with 4 VC KIA and 2 AK 47 and 1 RPG-7 launcher captured.

15. Another night ambush by Recon/1-18 Inf on 19 Jan northwest of Di An against a 8 man VC force resulted in 5 VC KIA and 2 AK 47s captured.

16. On the following day, A Co/1-18 Inf, while reconning an area of sampan activity on the Thi Tinh River vic XT758236, encountered several small elements resulting in 4 VC KIA and capture of 3 M1 carbines, 1 US cal .45 pistol, 1 M1 rifle, 50 100 lb bags of rice, and small amounts of munitions, clothing, and equipment.

(h) Late January was a period of light and scattered enemy activity in the Division TAOI with no contacts of significance occurring. Scattered VC attacks by fire of short duration, occasional reception of ralliers, light ambush patrol activity, characterized the period.

1. Two events of note at the close of the reporting period occurred on 31 Jan when an Air Cav Trp light observation helicopter from the 11th ACR received ground fire vic XT837436. The Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted into the area and captured 1 VC and 1 12.5mm anti-aircraft gun without enemy resistance.

2. The second event was the uncovering of a cache by E Trp/2-11 Cav vic XT836413 containing 1 BAR, 2 M2 carbines, 1 RPG launcher, 1.30 cal US MG, and miscellaneous munitions.

(i) The total results for Operation Toan Thang, Phase II, for the 1st Infantry Division assigned and OPCON units for this reporting period are:  
US: 111 KIA, 785 WIA (evac); 29 tanks, 25 ACAVs, 2 LWBBOYS, 4 rone plows, 2 VTRs, 2 (1/4) ton trucks, 1 (5) ton trk, 18 helicopters, 1 (2½) ton trk, 1 zippo, 1 82mm mort, 1 8" howitzer damaged; 1 helicopter, 35 ACAVs, 1 ammo carrier, 1 rone plow, 1 (3/4) ton trk, 1 (1/4) ton trk, 20 tanks, 1 O-1 aircraft, 3 (1½) ton trailers, 1 155mm howitzer destroyed.  
ENEMY: 702 KIA, 160 KIA (poss), 93 PW, 23 ralliers, 966 detainees; 481 indiv wpns, 68 crew served wpns, 183758 SA rds, 948 gren, 4793 AT mines, 358 AP mines, 629 RPG rds, 1888 mort rds, 59.6 ton rice, 3461 hrs, 7.9 tons of foodstuffs, 2 rockets captured/destroyed.

(j) During the reporting period, 73 B-52 strikes were employed in the Fishhook, Catcher's Mitt, and Trapezoid areas against enemy troop concentrations, infiltration routes, and base areas. Low level air and ground operations following strikes revealed effective destruction of base areas. Accurate assessment of casualties was difficult to determine; however, PW and agent reports did reveal that the psychological effect of the strikes was in fact of great value. Enemy units were reluctant to mass for fear of aerial bombardment.

(5) Accelerated Pacification Campaign: (a) In September 68, the 1st Infantry Division received notification from Headquarters, II FFORC&V, of the forthcoming campaign to be known as the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign". The campaign would encompass a time frame of three months, 1 Nov 68 thru 31 Jan 69, and would require the support of FVNAF.

(b) In October 68 the 1st Division received initial implementing instructions culminating with a letter of instruction, "Support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign", on 25 October 68. By the end of October 68, Division plans had been finalized, presented to, and approved by

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the 1st Division Commanding General. Plans allowed for the extension of the campaign through 17 February 68, the starting date for the Vietnamese Tet holiday.

(c) The mission for the 1st Division as stated by HQ, 1st FFORCEV, entailed the "support of an Accelerated Pacification Campaign during the period 1 November 68 through 17 February 69. The overall goal is to upgrade 250 hamlets within the III CTZ with 'C', 'D', and 'E' rating to 'C' rating." The ratings refer to the system established countrywide by USARV, whereby hamlets are rated in descending order (A-B-C-D-E-VC) according to their degree of security. Evaluation is provided on a monthly basis by all senior District advisors. The missions, translated into simple terms, charged the Division with supporting the pacification campaign in order to raise the security of those hamlets targeted within the Division TAOI.

(d) The total number of hamlets targeted in this campaign within the Division TAOI numbered 61. By the end of November 68, one of these hamlets was abandoned by the people, bringing the number of target hamlets to 60. One other hamlet was added in late December 68. The sponsor of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was the Government of Vietnam. The Division role was to support GVN's efforts.

(e) To understand the reason behind this special campaign, it is necessary to keep in mind the hamlet security situation existing at the time. In Vietnam the problems of security are of a complex nature since no enemy or friendly territory is delineated throughout the country. VC controlled hamlets can be found surrounded by GVN controlled hamlets, or vice versa. Contested hamlets are to be found a few miles from Saigon. The Division Commanding General, addressing his Brigade and Battalion Commanders on 10 November 68, stated the problem in very simple terms, "It does not matter how many enemy units we destroy on the battlefield if we lose the hamlets, the populated areas. If this comes to pass we will indeed have lost the war."

(f) Organization for combat for support of the campaign was stabilized by the Commanding General. The units involved, 2d Brigade, 3d Brigade, and 11th ACR, were assured that no major components would be taken from assigned pacification missions except for critical contingency purposes.

(g) The task of pacifying was conducted with the "spirit of the offensive." All units concerned were given responsibility for a portion of the TAOI containing hamlets targeted by the GVN for pacification. Units were directed in 1st Division LOI 22-68, "Support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign" to conduct RIF operations, ambushes, sweeps, cordon and search and mobile resources control operations in and around target hamlets. A vigorous counter VC Infrastructure program was directed. Civic action and psychological operations were to be concentrated in the target hamlets. Combined operations were to be utilized at the lowest possible level so as to benefit from Vietnamese assets (native expertise) in the area.

(h) The following activities were conducted, without exception, by all units concerned in order to upgrade security in the target hamlets:

1. NDP's were established in the vicinity of target hamlets.
2. Coordination was effected on a daily basis with District/Province officials and US advisors.
3. Liaison personnel were located in District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers in order to exchange intelligence information on an immediate basis.

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4. Units, down to platoon level, were assigned as "sponsors" for each of the target hamlets.
5. Logistical support was given to RF/PF units in the area in order to improve their tactical posture in the vicinity of the target hamlets.
6. Plans were drawn to provide a ready reaction force for any of the hamlets subjected to attacked by the VC.
7. Counter-VCI Platoons were formed to neutralize the VC Infrastructure. Platoons were composed of two US infantry squads, 12 Kit Carson Scouts, a senior aidman, and an interpreter.
8. Selective Cordon & Search operations were conducted in the target hamlets.
9. Civic Action and psychological operations effort multiplied approximately five fold in target hamlets.

(i) As of 31 January 69 selected cumulative data for operations in and near target hamlets since the start of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign is as follows.

1. Cordon and Search - 38
2. Ambushes - 3,713
3. RIF - 2,887
4. VCI KIA - 69
5. VCI PW - 62
6. MEDCAPS - 905
7. Self-Help (Civic Action) Projects - 287

8. Psychological operations-Air/ground loudspeakers - 371:55 (hours), leaflets - 7,882,824.

(j) The statistical progress of the campaign is as follows.

1. 60 hamlets as of 30 Nov 68: 33 hamlets "C" category or better  
26 hamlets below "C" category  
1 hamlet abandoned
2. 60 hamlets as of 31 December 68: 51 hamlets "C" category or better  
9 hamlets below "C" category
3. 60 hamlets as of 31 January 69: 60 hamlets "C" category or better.  
No hamlets below "C" category.

(k) The Accelerated Pacification Campaign achieved successfully all established goals and brought 111,928 civilians under GVN control.

d. (U) Training.

(1) Replacement Training:

(a) The objectives of replacement training are:

1. To provide initial briefing and orientation to all incoming personnel upon their arrival in the division.

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2. To provide training to company grade officers and all enlisted personnel prior to their participation in combat operations.

3. To provide a four hour course of instruction on the M16 rifle.

(b) Replacement training is conducted by the Brigade Replacement Training schools at Di An and Lai Khe. Consolidation of all replacement training under a training command at Di An is in progress. The training command should be in operation 15 Feb 69.

(c) Number of replacements trained during the reporting period are:

1st Bde	950
2d Bde	1237
3d Bde	1365
Div Arty	340
DISCOM	374

(2) Mobile Training Team: This Division employs a mobile training team within the framework of the Division's training program.

(a) The mission of the team is three fold: To train small unit leaders, to standardize small unit tactical procedures within the Division, and to get the Commanding General's policies down to the troops.

(b) The team is composed of one senior Infantry Captain who has commanded a rifle company in the Division for at least four months, and four NCO's, SSG and above, who have prior experience as instructors and who have served as platoon sergeant or platoon leader for at least six months.

(c) The normal course of instruction conducted by the team consists of three days of intensified training on general subjects, offensive tactics, and defensive tactics.

(d) A special testing and training program to upgrade 81mm mortar platoons was initiated during the reporting period.

(e) Statistics.

1. MTT activities for the quarter ended 31 Jan 69.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NR OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>HRS OF INSTR</u>	<u>MAN HOURS</u>	<u>DATE LAST TRAINED</u>
1-2 Inf	465	65	1954	30 Jan 69
2-2 Inf	64	30	640	26 Jan 69
1-16 Inf	130	46	1266	3 Jan 69
1-18 Inf	139	24	760	18 Jan 69
1-26 Inf	95	12	454	27 Dec 68
2-28 Inf	498	64	2301	19 Jan 69
11 ACR	493	34	2332	11 Jan 69
Totals	1884	275	9707	

2. Cumulative instruction record through 31 Jan 69.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NR OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>HRS OF INSTR</u>	<u>MAN HOURS</u>	<u>DATE LAST TRAINED</u>
1-2 Inf	1077	263	11770	30 Jan 69
2-2 Inf	483	95	7766	26 Jan 69
1-16 Inf	1097	152	15916	3 Jan 69
2-16 Inf	713	107	13070	10 Sep 68

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1-18 Inf	808	195	13112	18 Jan 69
2-18 Inf	678	101	8831	26 Oct 68
1-26 Inf	847	212	13042	27 Dec 68
1-28 Inf	696	168	12708	7 Oct 68
2-28 Inf	1447	313	20761	19 Jan 69
11 ACR	870	62	4147	
Totals	8716	1668	121123	

(3) ARVN Refresher Training: During the reporting period the 3d Battalion, 7th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division completed refresher training in conjunction with 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. The 5th Combat Engineer Battalion, 5th ARVN Division received a nine week refresher training course in conjunction with 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. Refresher training for 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, 5th ARVN Division began on 6 Jan 69 in conjunction with 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and is scheduled to terminate in early Feb 69.

(4) Impact Teams: The mission of this program is to improve the effectiveness of RF/PF units. An impact team consists of 1 officer, 1 NCO, and 1 interpreter, plus specialists in medical, signal, ordnance, engineer, etc., on call. The working method of the Impact Teams emphasizes visits of short duration and high impact, low cost projects stressing Vietnamese self-help. Assistance rendered is the field of training, barrier and defensive construction, and material support when supplies are not available through GVN channels.

(5) TDY schools: Schools and number of personnel attended are as follows:

COURSE	LOCATION	NR OF STUDENTS
MACV Recondo	Nha Trang	27
AARTS	Vung Tau	41
AH-1G Transition	Bien Hoa	5
OH-6A Transition	Bien Hoa	5
Signal	Long Binh	26
JcST	Republic of Phillipines	1
JSS	Republic of Phillipines	2
Physical Security	Long Binh	2
Radar AN/PRR-5 Cper	Lai Khe	12
DS/GS Maint	Long Binh	2

(6) The revised pocket size edition of 1st Inf Div Fundamentals of Infantry Tactics was completed on 8 Nov 68 and dispatched to the printer. Distribution began on 6 Feb 69. At Inclosure 19 is a copy of the revised pamphlet.

e. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) The total estimated strength of enemy Main Force military units operating in the 1st Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) is approximately 3900 personnel with an additional 465 Local Force personnel. This figure represents a combat strength of about 4365 troops with an additional 1800 personnel providing logistical support. The decrease in strength from the 12,000 figure in the previous reporting period results from a reduction in the size of the 1st Division's TAOI. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Division TAOI are unknown; however, at least 2000 personnel infiltrated into the TAOI during Nov, Dec., and Jan with the bulk going to units in SR-1.

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(b) Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division TAOI are from the 7th NVA Division, 5th VC Division, 101st NVA Regiment, 273d Regiment, and 268th VC Regiment. All units within the Division's TAOI can be expected to have Artillery units in support.

(c) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division TAOI and along its periphery are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>CURRENT PROB LOC</u>
<u>SEPARATE REGIMENTS</u>			
Dong Nai Regt	1000-2000	MCE	Catcher's Mitt
1st Thu Duc Regt	500	MCD	Dispersed Nhon Trach District
69th Arty Cmd	150		XT 4572
74th Arty Regt	1000	CE	Dispersed Ba Bien Prov, SR4, Bien Hoa
208th Arty Regt	650	CE	Unlocated
K33 Arty Bn	350	CE	Unlocated
K34 Arty Bn	250	CE	Dispersed NE War Zone "C"
52 Arty Bn	400	CE	Dispersed SE War Zone "C"
<u>LOCAL FORCE UNITS</u>			
C61 Ben Cat Co	60-75	CE	XT 710335
C62 Chau Thanh LF Co	80	MCE	XT 8825
C63 Lai Thieu LF Co	75	MCE	XT 818084
C64 Dau Tieng LF Co	100	CE	XT 525556
C65 Phu Cuong	50	MCL	XT 810280
C300 Dong Nai Co	75	MCE	XT 916140
C301 Phu Giao Co	35	MCE	XT 818312
C302 Tan Uyen Pit	UNK	MCE	UNK
C303 Co	70	MCE	XT 004303
81st RSG	UNK	N/A	Logistics area "A"/War Zone "D" and large portions of SR5, UL, and Da Nang Prov.

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83rd RSG	UNK	N/A	Logistics area "C"/Long Nguyen Secret Zone port- ion of Tay Ninh Prov. SR5, and Saigon area, SRL
85th RSG	UNK	N/A	Logistics area "F"/Binh Long Prov. W border of Phouc Long Prov. and Cambodian border.

(d) The Accepted Locations of Confirmed Enemy Units considered available as Reinforcements are:

<u>7th NVA Div</u>	6000	CE	XU 7025
Hq & Spt units	500-1000	N/A	Div Hq
13th Arty Bn	UNK	UNK	UNK
141st NVA Regt	1200	CE	NW Binh Long Prov
165th NVA Regt	1150	FCE	NW Binh Long Prov
32nd NVA Regt	2000	CE	NW Binh Long Prov
<u>5th VC Division</u>	3350	CE	Song Be corridor
33rd Regt	1400	FCE	Unloc. (poss War Zone "D")
275th VC Regt	1300	CE	Unloc. (poss War Zone "D")
88th NVA Regt	1400	MCE	Vic Ho Bo Woods
<u>174th NVA Regt</u>	1200	CE	W Phouc Long Prov
<u>101st NVA Regt</u>	900	MCE	W Phouc Long Prov
<u>274th VC Regt</u>	1125	MCE	Ba Bien (VC) Prov
268th VC Regt <u>Iron Triangle</u>	1500-1800	CE	Poss War Zone "C" X. 545232

Local Force Units

1st VC MF Inf Bn	300	MCE	NE Trang Bang
2nd VC MF Inf Bn	300	MCE	Trapezoid
4th Gia Dinh Sapper Bn	250	CE	NE of Cu Chi
C10 Sapper Bn	175	MCE	CMD
7 VC LF Inf Bn	225	MCE	N of Cu Chi
D1 VC LF Sapper Bn (Ul)	200	MCE	YT 1230
D2 VC LF Sapper Bn (Ul)	125	MCE	YT 1816

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## (e) Main Force Combat Units within the 1st Infantry Division - TAOI.

1. DONG NAI REGIMENT: With the exception of the K1 Bn, the Dong Nai Regiment remained in northern base areas during the month of Nov. The K2 and K3 battalions remained in the Catcher's Mitt, elements of K4 were dispersed east of Lai Khe to the Catcher's Mitt, and K1 continued to operate in the An Son - Lai Thieu areas. Documents captured on 2 Dec identified the missions of K1 as conducting armed propaganda activities, annihilating RVN officials and recruiting agents from Lai Thieu to Thu Duc, assisting the Lai Thieu District Unit in promoting the guerrilla warfare movement and making preparations for a forthcoming operation under the control of the regimental XO. On 19 Nov 68, Thu Duc District Forces vic XS 899974 captured a PW, Nguyen Van Tham, deputy commander of the Staff Section, Dong Nai Regiment. Tham was on a mission in the Hiep Binh area to recon from Nha Mot (XS 873973) to Rach Mon (XS 896971) for areas to quarter troops of the K1 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. Also on 19 Nov, vic XT 933382, ARF/11th ACR captured a PW from the C6 Co, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. The PW indicated that elements of the K2 Bn were moving from the Catcher's Mitt to a new location along Hwy 13. This was further substantiated by a rallier from the An Son Guerrillas on 28 Nov 68 who stated that the C3, K2 Bn had moved into an abandoned section of An Thu Hamlet, An Son Village (XT 8209) on 27 Nov. An 11th ACR contact on 1 Dec 68, vic XT 998385, resulted in 34 VC KIA. Documents identified the VC as members of the Dong Nai Regiment, possibly a headquarters element. The documents also revealed a plan of attack by the Dong Nai Regiment along Rte #16. The purpose of these attacks, directed against FSBs in the Binh Ky - Binh Co areas, would apparently have been to distract allied units to allow the dispatch south of the major portion of the regiment. The compromise of this plan, however, resulted in its cancellation. In a contact on 3 Dec 68, vic XT 814344 and XT 800337, B/1-16 AP engaged approx 9 VC resulting in 6 VC KIA and 1 PW. The PW, a member of C1, K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment, located a base camp (XT 841341) of his battalion which had been used frequently during October and November. On 19 Dec, vic XT 834099, A/1-28 captured a PW from the C3, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. The PW stated that the K2 Bn was located in the An Son area. This was further substantiated by a 26 Dec PW from the C2, K1 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment who stated that the K1 Bn had been replaced in the An Son area by the K2 Bn. The K1 had moved back to the Catcher's Mitt, vic XT 9630, probably because of problems with low morale. On 30 Dec, vic XT 807371 to XT 825370, 11th ACR made contact with a VC force resulting in 13 VC/NVA KIA, 8 VC/NVA PWs and 2 Hoi Chanh. The PWs appeared to be from various units - K1 and K4 Bns, Dong Nai Regiment; H12 Rocket Company; C612 Rocket Launcher Company and C510 Recon Company of SR-5. All appeared to be on a rice resupply mission. On 4-5 Jan 69, vic XT 895-044, Thu Duc PRU and 1st Division elements captured 9 PWs from various elements of Subregion 5 and the Dong Nai Regiment. The PWs from SR-5 were on missions to recon staging areas and targets for the Winter-Spring Offensive. A PW from the C14 Mortar Company, Dong Nai Regt, was reconning possible mortar sites and PWs from the C20 Signal Company, Dong Nai Regiment, stated that they were performing commo-liaison missions in the Lai Thieu area. Late December and early January ralliers and PWs resulting from numerous small contacts in the An Son area continued to identify the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment, which apparently had much the same mission as the K1 Bn, which it had replaced in the An Son area. On 9 Jan 69, 4/8 ARVN captured 2 PW from the K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment, vic XT 809298. One PW, identified as Nguyen Van Duc, Asst PO of the K4 Bn, stated that the K4 Bn was located vic XT 9238. On 12 Jan 69, vic XT 8603, Thu Duc National Police captured 3 PWs, one of whom was identified as Huynh Van Sau, XO of the Staff Section, Dong Nai Regiment. Sau was on a mission to recon possible staging areas for the Dong Nai Regiment. He also stated that the Dong Nai Regiment was to attack Saigon during the Winter-Spring Campaign. This was in agreement with the statements of a number of PWs; however, none were able to provide a starting date for the Offensive. The most frequently mentioned time period fell from 20 Jan 69, the date

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by which all recon was to be accomplished, to 17 Feb 69, the TET New Year. As of the end of Jan, the K2 Bn appeared to still be in the An Son area, although contacts with it were less frequent. The other three battalions of the Regiment appeared to still be dispersed from the area east of Lai Khe to the western Catcher's Mitt. Although the Dong Nai Regiment appears to be still adhering to an offensive policy against Saigon, it is doubtful that it is capable of successfully initiating such an offensive.

2. 5th VC/NVA Division: During the period Nov 68 - Jan 69, movement was detected that indicated that the 5th VC/NVA Division was in the process of relocating to War Zone "D". As of late Jan 69, the bulk of the 33d and 275th Regiments appeared to be dispersed along the Song Be corridor north of the Division TAOI. However, elements of the 275th Regiment had been identified in small contacts north of Phuoc Vinh during Dec and Jan. On 11 Dec, vic XT 967653, Project Delta contacted an estimated enemy squad resulting in 1 KIA. Documents identified B4, A55 (poss Military Staff Section, 275th Regt). On 11 Jan, vic XT 978638, B/1-28 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Documents identified the KIA as a member of K17, A55 (poss RR Company, 275th Regiment). On 14 Jan, vic YT 031639, C/1-28 AP engaged 4 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Documents identified A55, K23 (poss Medical Company, 275th Regiment). The relocation of the 5th Division to War Zone "D" once again presents a division-sized threat against the eastern portion of the Division TAOI.

3. Quyet Thang Regiment (273C):

a. The Quyet Thang Regiment is presently composed of three battalions: K1 or 1st Battalion, K2 or 2nd Local Force Battalion and the 4 Gia Dinh Sapper Battalion. This constitutes a present strength of between 1200 and 1500 men, 2/3 of whom are NVA.

b. Recently captured documents following small contacts have provided documented proof of the 1st Battalion's existence. Previously the 1st Battalion was believed to have been destroyed in Saigon on 18 Jun 68. In Dec and the early part of Jan 69, the 1st Battalion conducted recon operations, resupplied, received political training and rested. The 1st Battalion has moved frequently because of repeated contacts, artillery and B-52 strikes. Recent reports indicate the K1 Battalion of the Regiment has been assigned the mission of supporting C61 (Ben Cat Local Force) while awaiting further orders to move on Saigon.

c. The 2nd Local Force Battalion attacked the 1st Division Fire Support Base at Junction City on 1 Dec 68. Throughout this reporting period the 2nd Battalion has been receiving replacements from infiltration groups. Until recently the mission of these new infiltrators and that of the entire battalion has been to rest and train until the proposed attack on Saigon. On 7 January a squad from the 2nd Battalion was engaged while returning to their unit after having completed reconnaissance of routes to be used in a future attack on Saigon.

d. The 4 Gia Dinh Sapper Battalion was responsible for destroying a section of the Phu Cuong Bridge on 6 Nov 68. The 4 Gia Dinh Sapper Battalion has reorganized in the past 3 months into an effective bridge sabotaging unit and has obtained personnel from a number of recently deactivated sapper companies.

e. Generally the morale of the Quyet Thang Regiment has varied from very high to very low. Morale basically appears to be in inverse relationship to the number of times a given unit has been in contact or has received artillery or B-52 strikes. Evidence obtained from PWs indicates a loose regimental command structure now exists in the Quyet Thang Regiment due to a lack of staff, political, and rear service sections at the regimental level.

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4. 1st VC Regiment, SR-4 (Thu Duc Regt): During the month of Nov 68, the 1st VC Regt, SR-4 continued to avoid contact. Most contacts with this unit were with regimental support elements, while the 2nd Bn, SR-4 and 4th Local Force Bn remained dispersed east of the Division TAOI. On 10 Nov, vic XS 953965, B/2-18 engaged a VC force resulting in 6 VC KIA. Documents identified the Signal Company of the 1st VC Regt, SR-4. On 16 Nov, vic XS 952940, A/2-18 captured a PW from the Rear Service Section of the 4th Bn, 1st VC Regiment. The PW stated that he had heard that the 4th Bn with a strength of 35 men was located in War Zone "D". On 6 Dec, D/4-12, 199th Bde, vic YS 262852, captured a note book maintained by a member of D2 (poss 2nd En, SR-4). The notebook revealed that the 2nd Bn had received replacements and was to take part in offensive action against the 9th and 1st Precincts in Saigon. However, on 22 Dec, vic YS 143827, 18th ARVN received a mortar and ground attack resulting in 75 VC KIA and 2 PWs. The PWs tentatively identified the attacking unit as the 2nd Bn, 1st VC Regt. On 24 Jan 69, vic XS 983920, a PW from the 4th Br, 1st VC Regt was captured by A/2-18. The PW stated that he was looking for a possible base camp and staging areas for the 4th Bn. He further stated that the 4th Bn consisted of 77 men and was located vic YS 268858. As of the end of Jan 69, the 1st VC Regiment did not appear to be a potent force as a regimental unit. The battalions appear to be operating independently, and documents indicate that the heavy weapons companies of the regiment may have been utilized to form a D6 Heavy Weapons Bn.

(f) LOCAL FORCE UNITS:

1. During the reporting period, Nov 1968 through Jan 1969, local forces have increased their harassing activities from the level of the previous reporting period. Local forces continued to support main force units by acting as guides, reconning for future missions, transporting supplies and conducting harassing actions against Allied installations and highways. A relatively new trend in local force tactics was detected during this period. On a local force level with the assistance of the main force units the local forces have conducted increased propaganda missions in attempts to get the populace to demand a coalition government and to demand that the Allies leave Vietnam.

2. The local forces have for extended periods of time avoined any type of contact. During these periods of avoided contact local force units rested, obtained food and ammunition supplies, propagandized hamlets and villages and carried out reconnaissance for future missions. The following local force units have been active within the 1st Infantry Division TAOI during the reporting period of Nov, Dec, and Jan.

3. C61 Ben Cat District Company: C61 during the reporting period continually conducted harassing operations against the ARVN installations in Ben Cat. C61 continued to avoid any direct contact with allied forces during Nov and Dec. During this period, C61 is believed to have rested during the day and reconned Ben Cat and the surrounding areas for future operations. Moreover, it was waiting for an opportunity to mortar U.S. and ARVN installations in Ben Cat District. During Jan, two PWs were captured from C61. The first PW was transferred to C61 from the 1st Battalion of the Quyet Thang Regiment. Recent information indicates the Quyet Thang Regiment is to assist C61 until they are told to start moving south at some later date. At present C61 is believed to have a strength of 53 enlisted men and 3 officers divided into two platoons. Morale is believed to be high in this local force company.

4. C62 Chau Thanh District Company: C62 has intensified its guerrilla operations in the rural areas. The current primary objective of the unit appears to be the destruction of rural development forces, the village political structures and intelligence agents. Documents support the belief that local forces are decentralizing their military efforts

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as a part of the 68-69 Winter-Spring Campaign. Another development directly related to the above decentralization is that cadre from main force units are being assigned to local forces and guerrilla elements in an effort to assist them in organizing propaganda campaigns directed toward winning the support of the people and the destruction of GVN control in the villages and hamlets.

5. C63 Lai Thieu District Company: No contacts were made with C63 during Nov, Dec, or Jan; however, two PWs were captured during the reporting period. C63 is operating under the control of the LAI THIEU DISTRICT UNIT PARTY. This district party follows the activities of ARVN forces in the area and then orders C63 to ambush or attack these forces. C63 does not maintain a permanent base camp, but normally operates around An Son coordinating with local guerrillas proselytizing the local populace and collecting food supplies.

6. C65 Phu Cuong City Platoon: The Phu Cuong City Platoon has avoided contact during Nov, Dec, and Jan. A PW captured in late Nov stated C65 has been resting and preparing for an attack on Phu Cuong City in the near future. Its present location in the northern end of its normal AO indicates C65 is attempting to evade friendly operations.

7. C301 Phu Giao District Company: The C301 Phu Giao District company has avoided contact during Nov, Dec, and Jan. The unit is probably continuing its interdiction of Highways 1A, 2A and 16, collecting taxes and resupplying in its AO.

(g) Artillery Units: Very little information has been received on enemy artillery units during the period 1 Nov-31 Jan; however, there have been some organizational changes detected in these units. Rocket and mortar attacks have been carried out on a somewhat limited basis probably due to allied operations and localized ammunition shortages.

1. 206th Rocket Regiment: Information on the 3x122mm rocket bns of the 206th Rocket Regiment has been limited. At the present time this unit is dispersed with elements in SRs 1, 2 and 5. It may also have elements with the 9th VC Division and have sent cadre to the recently organized rocket companies, C6 and C7 of SR-3, C112 of SR-5, and the 9th Arty Bn of SR-1.

2. 96th Arty Regiment: There has been no identification of this Regiment since it was reportedly organized in May 68. The Regiment is believed to be operating in War Zone "C", with 52 Arty Bn operating around Da Tieng and other allied installations in War Zone "C". The K33 and K34 battalions are believed to operate in War Zone "C", Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces. All three battalions have 107 and 122mm rocket capability.

3. 74th Arty Regiment: Formerly known as the 84th Arty Regiment, 74th Arty Regiment has been placed in support of the newly formed MR-7 which consists of SR-4, U-1, and VC Ba Bien Province. The 1st Bn is believed to be in the Bien Hoa Area and the 2 and 3 Bns in the Hoc Diep Area based on information provided by a Hoi Chanh. Rocket attacks in January on Long Binh Post and the mid-Dec attack on Dat Do (YS 602955) and captured documents tend to substantiate the location of the 2 and 3 Bns. The early Dec attack on 199 Light Infantry Brigade Rear Base Camp (Frenzell Jones) as well as the Oct and Nov rocket attacks on Bien Hoa Air Base also tend to substantiate the Hoi Chanh's location of the 1st Bn. Documents indicate that the Regiment is suffering from personnel and logistic shortages.

4. 56th AA Bn: Directly subordinate to the 69th Arty Command, this Bn, armed with 12.5mm HMG, 50 cal MG, and possibly 82 and 120mm mortars, is still believed to be in support of the 9th VC Division as it was during

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the 68 IET and May Offensives. This is supported by documents captured in the vic of Katum (XT 334903) on 25 Oct 68.

5. 58th Arty Bn: This 107 and 122mm Rocket Bn has been placed in support of the 5th VC Division according to documents captured by the 1st Cav Div (AM) north of Phuoc Vinh on 10 Dec 68. The Bn is currently dispersed in the vicinity of Phuoc Vinh and is probably responsible for the rocket attack conducted against the 1st Cav Div (AM) Base Camp located there.

6. 9th Arty Bn of SR-1: Documents captured vic XT 581263 on 1 Jan 69, listed two Arty Bns, the 8th and 9th, subordinate to SR-1. On 31 Dec 68, a PW (Nguyen Van Sau) confirmed the formation of the 9th Arty Bn. He stated the battalion had a strength of 100 men and is armed with an unknown number of 122mm rockets. The battalion's mission is to conduct attacks against allied installations in SR-1.

f. (C) Logistics.

(1) The event of significance in the logistical area in the reporting period was the Phuoc Vinh to Song Be Road Opening Operation. On 15 Jan 69 the 1st Division began up-grading and clearing operations along the Phuoc Vinh-Song Be Road under the control of 1st Brigade. Initially, 1-2 Inf (-) and 1-28 Inf (-) conducted security operations and established a FSPB and NDP while the 60th Land Clearing Company began clearing a 200 meter area on each side of Hwy 1A. On 16 Jan 69 the 1st Bde received the 1-7 ARVN, the 9th Recon Co (ARVN), and the 54th Engr Co (ARVN). Security operations continued, as the ARVN engineers repaired culverts and road surface. On 21 Jan 69 1st Bde released OFCON of 1-28 Inf (-). On 28 Jan 69, 1st Bde received the 984th Land Clearing Company in direct support. Operations continue as of the close of the reporting period at which time the cutting had progressed to within a few hundred meters of Dong Xoai.

(2) From a logistical viewpoint, the exercise posed a sizeable challenge. A forward support element from the Support Command was set up at Phuoc Vinh and displaced along with the tactical headquarters having the mission responsibility. This element was staffed by units of the Support Command to cover all classes of supply. This concept has proven to be very responsive and provided more than adequate support for the operation.

(3) The successful completion of the exercise will have decided impact on the lines of communication posture in the Division TAOI. Heretofore Song Be, the Province Headquarters of Phuoc Long Province, required complete resupply by air involving a sizeable logistic effort in terms of resources. The opening of Highway 1A will relieve that situation in addition to extending GVN control in the area and opening large rubber producing areas.

g. (C) Organization:

(1) Major Organizational changes took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the reporting period.

(a) Due to movement of a large number of 1st Division elements out of both Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi Base Camp, the 234th and 260th Field Artillery Detachments were detached from the 1st Division and attached to the 23rd Artillery Group with an effective date of 25 November 1968.

(b) The following units were reorganized: 1st Engr Bn; HME, 1st Inf Div Arty; HMC, 1st Inf Div; HNC, Inf Bde 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades; 1st Med Bn; 121st Sig Bn; 1st Admin Co; 1st MP Co; HNC and Band, DISCOM; 1st Sup and Transport Bn; and 701st Maint Bn. Authority for reorganization was letter, AGSD-C (5 Sep 68) ACSFOR, HQ DA, 24 September 1968, Sub-

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ject: Approval of MTOE (USARPAC NO. 65, FY 69) and USARPAC General Orders Number 775, dated 22 November 1968. Implementation of MTOE for units involved was effective 20 December 1968 as indicated in 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 13469, dated 26 December 1968.

1. Reorganization of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 1st Infantry Division was implemented under MTOE 7-4G. Basic organization remained the same except for deletion of the Medical Section and increasing the number of personnel from 46 Officers and 107 Enlisted Men under the E TOE to 61 Officers and 109 Enlisted Men under the G TOE. The General Staff sections absorbed the largest part of the increases of the 23 additional personnel. The equipment level remained unchanged except for minor items of equipment.

2. Reorganization of the Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades, 1st Infantry Division was implemented under MTOE 7-42G. Under MTOE 7-42G, Bde will have 27 Officers, 4 Warrant Officers and 97 Enlisted Men. This gives the HHC, Bde an increase of 4 Officers and 4 Enlisted Men, but a loss of 2 Warrant Officers. Equipment levels remain the same in most cases.

3. Headquarters, Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, 1st Infantry Division was reorganized under MTOE 6-302G. This gave the unit 38 Officers, 11 Warrant Officers and 164 Enlisted Men for a total of 213 men. It increases the Officer strength by 4, the Warrant Officers by 7 with a loss of 3 Enlisted Men. There was no change to the basic organization and only a slight increase of equipment.

4. The 1st Engineer Battalion was reorganized under MTOE 5-156G for HQ, MTOE 157G for Companies A, B, C and D and MTOE 5-148G for Company E or Bridge Company. It provides the 1st Engineer Battalion 43 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers and 926 Enlisted Men. The Battalion lost 1 Officer, gained 1 Warrant Officer and 20 Enlisted Men. The basic organization for Companies A, B, C, D, and E remains the same. In Headquarters, Headquarters Company, the Atomic Demolitions Munitions Platoon has been deleted. The equipment levels for the Battalion remain almost the same as under the E TOE.

5. The 1st Medical Battalion was reorganized under MTOE 8-36G for HQ & Company A and MTOE 8-37G for Companies B, C and D. The strength levels are: HQ & Company A, 17 Officers and 114 Enlisted; Companies B, C and D, 7 Officers and 73 Enlisted Men. The total is 38 Officers and 333 Enlisted Men. The change to G MTOE gave the Battalion an increase of 22 men. The basic organization remained the same except for the addition of the Optometry Platoon to HQ & Company A. The reorganization of the Medical Battalion caused a slight reduction of equipment.

6. The strength level of the 121st Signal Battalion under the reorganization is 25 Officers, 5 Warrant Officers, and 611 Enlisted Men, for a total of 641 personnel for the Battalion. The Battalion was reorganized under MTOE 11-36G HQC, MTOE 11-37G Company A, MTOE 11-38G Company B and MTOE 11-39G Company C. The basic organization for Company B and C remains the same while in HQC the Photo Section is deleted and Company D the Cable Installation Teams have been reduced by two. The equipment levels remain the same.

7. The 1st Administration Company has an increase of 165 men when reorganized under MTOE 12-37G. Its strength levels are 34 Officers, 9 Warrant Officers, and 502 Enlisted Men, for a total of 545 men. The basic organization has changed with the deletion of the Examination Section and Replacement Teams. The following sections have been added: Career Counseling Branch, Awards and Decoration Branch, Casualty Reporting Branch and the Training Section. The addition of the Training Section and increase of personnel in the Replacement Detachment will staff the Schools

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Command currently being formed in Di An and expected to be in operation  
15 February 1969. The equipment levels have increased.

g. 1st Military Police Company was reorganized under MTOE 19-27G with strength level of 9 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 178 Enlisted Men for a total of 189 men. The basic organization and strength level remain the same. The Military Police Company under the reorganization lost a number of wheeled vehicles and other various equipment.

g. Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Band, DISCOM, increased strength levels by 6 personnel under the current organization. The strength levels are 18 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 84 Enlisted Men for a total of 103 men. The basic organization changed with the deletion of the Information Section. There was a slight reduction in the equipment levels. HHC & Band is now organized under MTOE 29-2G.

10. 1st Support and Transport Battalion was reorganized under MTOE 29-6G for HHC, MTOE 10-7G for Company A, and MTOE 55-88G for Company B. The Battalion strength level increased by 21 personnel. The strength levels are 26 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 457 Enlisted Men for a total of 485 Personnel. The basic organization remained the same for HHC and Company B, but Company A has added a Bath Section. The equipment levels were slightly decreased, especially in wheeled vehicles.

11. The 701st Maintenance Battalion was reorganized under MTOE 29-16G, HQ & Company A; MTOE 29-17G for Companies B, C, & D; and MTOE 55-89 for Company E with a total increase of 21 personnel. The Battalion strength levels are 31 Officers, 17 Warrant Officers, and 806 Enlisted Men for a total of 854 personnel. The basic organization remained the same for Companies B, C, D, and E, but HQ & Company A added a Storage Section. The Battalion has lost some equipment under the reorganization.

(c) On 28 December 1968, 1st Infantry Division General Order Number 13587 was published attaching 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 2d Infantry, to 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division with effective date of 1 January 1969.

(d) USARV General Order Number 56 dated 6 January 1969 attached CO B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, to 1st Infantry Division. The Company consists of 5 Officers and 87 Enlisted men for a total of 92 personnel. The company is presently located at Lai Khe Base Camp and has been further attached to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division.

h. (C) Psychological Operations:

(1) Psychological Operations this quarter were aimed at three general target groups:

(a) Civilians

(b) NVA/VC

(c) VCI

(2) During the quarter a total of 43,244,200 leaflets were disseminated. A total of 289½ hours of loudspeaker broadcast and 1,309 hours ground operations were employed in support of the Division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of support operations:

UNIT	LEAFLETS	BROADCAST TIME	GROUND OPERATIONS
1st Brigade	90,000	1 hour 00 min	55 hours 00 min
2d Brigade	14,249,750	187 hours 10 min	.750 hours 00 min

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3d Brigade	28,390,300	92 hours 00 min	1'7 hours 00 min
11th ACR	<u>514,150</u>	<u>9 hours 30 min</u>	<u>357 hours 00 min</u>
TOTAL	43,244,200	289 hours 40 min	1,309 hours 00 min

i. (C) Civic Action/Civil Affairs:

(1) The MEDCAP Program within the Division treated a total of 54,811 patients during the reporting period. This is an increase of 31,433 over the previous period. This increase may be attributed to greater emphasis being placed on MEDCAPS at all levels, and improved reporting procedures.

(2) During the reporting period action was taken to improve the training of GVN medics; medical personnel were trained at both 2d and 3d Brigades, with additional training given the medics during conduct of MEDCAP operations.

(3) A nine day Vietnamese language class was held for some of the US medics and doctors who accompany the MEDCAP Operations. Taught by an outstanding Vietnamese interpreter, the medics were taught 150 medical phrases often used in MEDCAPS. This token language capability has enabled the medics to show their sincere concern for their patients and has greatly improved their effectiveness. The instruction was enthusiastically received by the medics.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel.

(1) Experience of NCOs.

(a) OBSERVATION: Manpower shortages will continue to occur, but this is only occasionally a serious problem. However, the quality of infantry "CO's in terms of experience, professional competence and maturity is a critical problem.

(b) EVALUATION: Highly effective military units are those in which professional excellence exists at each level in the hierarchy of command. When this condition does not exist, a leadership gap occurs with the resulting reduction in efficiency. The average infantry company has but a handful of experienced NCOs, and many squad leaders are little more experienced than the men they lead. The repercussions of this situation are reflected in all areas of the unit's endeavors. Most obviously, it forces each echelon of command to become more involved in doing the work of the subordinate echelon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The roots of this problem are beyond the ability of local commands to solve. However, this problem should be studied to determine the most effective means for training infantry NCOs upon their arrival or promotion.

(2) NCO Candidate Course Graduates.

(a) OBSERVATION: The NCO graduates received during the period were found to be well qualified to perform at the E5 level and in some cases the E6 level.

(b) EVALUATION: The NCO graduate program has made a significant contribution toward relieving the shortage of qualified EM in the lower and middle skill levels. The program cannot, however, compensate for the lack of experience found in professional NCO's.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the NCO graduate program be continued and that emphasis be placed on the responsibility of the NCO to handle his men during combat operations and during periods of preparation, maintenance, and rest.

**(3) Controlled Infusion Program.**

(a) OBSERVATION: The USARV controlled infusion program involving the 1st Division and 5th Inf Div (Mech) in Jan 69 may not be the most acceptable solution to reduction of DEROS hump.

(b) EVALUATION: In Jan 69 the 1st Division supplied 72 EM in certain MOS fields to the 5th Inf Div (Mech) to relieve the 5th Inf Div of the problem of heavy losses in the month of July 69. The 1st Division received 74 EM with like PMOS who had DEROS in July 69. Although infusion by exchange of personnel between Divisions is an acceptable solution to reduction of DEROS hump, a better solution might be to loose DEROS hump personnel to special requirements, i.e., security guard levies, MACV levies, etc. Personnel reassigned in this manner could be gradually replaced from the replacement stream.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the above alternative solution be considered in like cases of DEROS hump. This observation and discussion has been passed to the Enlisted Replacement Division, USARV.

**b. (C) Operations.**

**(1) The Mini-Ambush.**

(a) OBSERVATION: In situations where the VC are operating in elements of platoon size or less, the units of the Division have successfully employed the mini-ambush.

(b) EVALUATION: The mini-ambush splits the US platoon into two elements which are within supporting distance of each other (100-300 meters). They may be placed on line, in an "L" shape, or back to back. Such configurations almost double the area of coverage, they significantly increase the probability of contact, and they are ideally suited for placement along likely avenues of VC infiltration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all FWMF, in situations where the VC are operating in elements of platoon size or less consider the use of the mini-ambush.

**(2) The Ambush Line.**

(a) OBSERVATION: Units of the Division have had considerable success in the employment of the ambush line along wide avenues of VC infiltration.

(b) EVALUATION: The ambush line consists of a series of platoon or mini-ambushes placed on a line across an avenue of VC infiltration. This line may be straight, bowed, or curved, and the distance between ambushes may vary from 100-300 meters depending on the terrain. The prime considerations are that the ambushes are within mutual supporting distance so that they are able to provide complete coverage along the ambush line. This configuration has proven itself effective against VC efforts to bypass. In a number of instances, VC point elements have made contact with one element of the ambush line, have attempted to bypass, and have been successfully engaged by another element along the line.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all FWMF consider the use of the ambush line to cover wide avenues of VC infiltration.

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(3) Programmed Ambush Initiation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Elements of the Division have successfully employed a technique of programmed ambush initiation.

(b) EVALUATION: The ambush is composed of a number of positions, each of which consists of 3-5 men. Each position employs an outer ring of five claymores, which are connected with detonating cord and attached to a single detonator. Upon the detection of VC in the killing zone of the ambush, the outer claymores are blown simultaneously, each man fires two magazines from his M-16 on semiautomatic setting and throws two fragmentation grenades, and one man from each position throws out a trip flare, which provides close-in illumination on the ground in the killing zone without disclosing the friendly positions. M-79 firing is delayed until the claymores have been blown. After these programmed actions have been completed, each man stops, listens, and observes. If movement, sound, or fire are detected, the ambush repeats the same procedure. The advantages of programmed ambush initiation are a heavy, surprise volume of initial fire; instant, reliable, close-in illumination; and force discipline.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all FWMF consider the use of the programmed ambush initiation.

(4) Use of Artillery Blocking Fires.

(a) OBSERVATION: In uninhabited areas, where artillery can be employed quickly and shifted easily, artillery blocking fires have been successfully used.

(b) EVALUATION: Upon sighting or contact with a VC element, VT and HQ artillery blocking fires are placed approximately 1000 meters in front of the ambush on likely avenues of VC approach and withdrawal. After the initial volleys, the fires are then carefully moved back towards the ambush position on line. This movement of fire has the effect of herding the VC back into the ambush positions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all FWMF consider the use of artillery blocking fires in the planning and conduct of ambushes.

(5) Combined Night Ambush Patrols.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combined night ambush patrols are ineffective unless they are integrated.

(b) EVALUATION: Experience has proven that, if RF/PF forces are given responsibility for a sector of the night ambush position, they become ineffective and jeopardize the safety of the patrol. When RF/PF soldiers are individually placed between US Troops, they remain attentive and responsive to the patrol leader.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That individual RF/PF soldiers be integrated between US troops when positioning personnel in a night ambush site during a combined night operation.

(5) Fire Coordination Line (FCL) for Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Fire Coordination Lines are essential when conducting a combined operation in which a unit is used as a blocking force or is not directly linked to its counterpart.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that Fire Coordination Lines are essential to combined operations in which the forces become separated.

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These lines should be placed along easily identifiable terrain. The Vietnamese understand and respect the FCL.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a Fire Coordination Line be established whenever forces will be separated during a combined operation.

(7) Mass Mobile Resource Control Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: With recent intelligence on the VC moving toward Saigon in commercial vehicles, a method of control was needed to check out civilians along MSR's and secondary roads.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1-4 Cav had a Mobile Resource Control Team, consisting of two Military Police and two National Police, under its operational control since the beginning of the period. This team established two or three control points daily throughout the AO and maintained an average of four to six detainees per week. The Mass Mobile Resource Control operation was organized using the same technique and establishing a total of 33 control points daily. The entire AO can be thoroughly checked in a minimum of two or three days. This method of operation was very successful in covering the entire AO and checking out maximum number of personnel and vehicles. During this operation, 25,701 personnel and 10,101 vehicles were screened, resulting in 20 detainees. The detainees were found to be draft dodgers or ARVN AWOL's or they had ID card discrepancies and were later released.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other Cavalry units employ this Mass MRCT technique.

(8) Snatch Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: In order to reduce the VCI in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign hamlets, it was necessary to establish a technique to operate in populated areas at night.

(b) EVALUATION: Early in the Pacification Program, a VCI Platoon was organized. This platoon was composed of a reinforced US rifle squad and six to eight Kit Carson Scouts under the leadership of a US Platoon Leader. The mission was intelligence gathering, operating in the hamlets during the day and questioning the local villagers on recent VC activity. Most VC activity occurred at night; this prompted the development of the "snatch" operation. Several techniques have been tried. However, the most sound method is to establish a patrol base and dispatch a snatch squad. This squad, consisting of about 5-10 personnel to include Kit Carson scouts and an interpreter, moves throughout the hamlet on a planned route, listens in at doors and windows to gain intelligence, and snatch VC. This type of operation has been used on three occasions. Two out of the three attempts resulted in contact. On one snatch operation involving the LRP's, contact was made with an estimated five VC; it was later learned that three of the VC were killed and two wounded. This item should be considered in conjunction with item (9) (Cordon and Search Operations).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other RMPF use this technique of snatch operations.

(9) Cordon and Search Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period it has been more apparent that the extended cordon and search operations (5-10 days) have a number of advantages over the more predominant shorter operation (1-2 days).

(b) EVALUATION: Normal cordon and search operations have been initiated during darkness (2400 hours), a village search conducted at first

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light of the following day, and the seal terminated at mid-day (1200 hours). Results have been primarily the apprehension of draft dodgers, deserters, and civil defendants. An extended seal of 10 days duration was conducted during the reporting period resulting in 21 VC ralliers and 56 VCI captured.

It was felt that the extended duration of the seal was a significant factor in the outstanding results. The period in which VC can sustain themselves in underground complexes in sealed areas is limited. As a normal rule the complexes are stocked with 2-3 days supply of food and water. The complexes are not designed and built for extended occupation. If resupply efforts by VC sympathizers in the villages can be thwarted through personal presence of US and GVN personnel on a continual basis, it becomes necessary for VC personnel in underground shelters, hide-outs, etc. to emerge after a limited period. Experience in the successful operations indicated that the younger, less dedicated VC will emerge in the 3-6 day time frame while the hard-core VC emerged in the 7-10 day time frame.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When availability of assets and tactical conditions permit, units give selective consideration to extended cordon and search operations.

(10) Use of Marking Smoke in Airmobile Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Use of smoke grenades to mark LZ's and PZ's during the dry season has become a dangerous fire hazard.

1. Open areas favorable for LZ's and PZ's are normally dry and grassy after the monsoon season. Smoke grenades fanned by the rotor blades of helicopters have produced grass fires which endanger personnel, equipment and the successful accomplishment of airmobile assaults and extractions.

2. Use of smoke grenades to guide CH 47 and CH 54 resupply/equipment sorties into established FSB/NDP's has started hazardous grass fires within and adjacent to the FSB/NDP.

(b) EVALUATION: Headquarters, 1st Bde in conjunction with the 11th Aviation Battalion has studied the problems listed above. After discussing the pros and cons of various methods used by other units and by experimenting with suggested solutions, the following techniques were experimented with during two battalion insertions and two extractions and were highly successful. These techniques are now SOP for all units in the 1st Brigade and have been used successfully in all insertions and extractions.

1. Initially, panel markers were considered in an attempt to preclude smoke. However, based upon the comments of Air Mission Commanders pertaining to the difficulty of seeing panels in high grass when the lift aircraft use a low level approach, this idea was discarded.

2. A safe method of employing smoke within the confines of a 50 caliber ammunition container has been successfully tested. The can is initially prepared by cutting holes in the top and sides with an acetylene torch. Ventilation was found necessary to facilitate burning and get a better volume of smoke. Then approximately three inches of dirt is placed in the bottom to stabilize the can. The lid is left on to facilitate carrying the can. A pair of engineer gloves is also provided to remove expended grenades when providing continuous smoke. A minimum of six ammo cans are used for insertions and extractions. Each of the five security elements is provided with a can and one can is provided for a designated individual to use in bringing in the lead aircraft in each lift. Two men should work each can. One opens and stabilizes the can while the other activates and inserts the smoke grenade. The top is closed as added insurance against fire. After a grenade is expended, the man wearing the gloves removes it and the procedure is repeated as often as required to

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guide the flights into the LZ or PZ. These cans are durable and can be used repetitively.

3. FSB/NDP resupply is accomplished solely with radios and panel markers. If more than one unit is in the FSB/NDP, one callsign and frequency is designated for all missions and resupply helicopters are so informed. A representative from each unit in the FSB/NDP is required to be at the resupply pad with the radio operator. A fire prevention team is also located at the pad during the supply and as long as resupply remains on the pad.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That smoke cans be used on all airmobile operations as a fire prevention measure.

2. That designated radio frequencies be established for all resupply at established FSB/NDP's in lieu of smoke as a fire prevention measure. Panel markers should be firmly emplaced to further assist incoming aircraft.

(11) Vegetation Burning.

(a) OBSERVATION: There is a requirement in RVN for equipment to burn large areas of jungle vegetation.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been noted that defoliated targets must be followed by burning except where the target consists of large leafy trees. Brush, grass, bamboo and similar growths merely turn brown. Flamethrowers do not provide sufficient area coverage. Field expedient techniques such as pumping and igniting diesel fuel on the target foliage are successful but are laborious and time consuming. Additionally there are occasions where grass and undergrowth are required to be removed without destroying rubber trees or other money crops. It appears that small, rough terrain grass and brush cutters are required for the later areas and high production brush burners required where constraints do not exist.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That a rough terrain grass and brush cutter be investigated.

2. That a high production brush burner system be investigated.

(12) Use of D7E Tractor in Clearing Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The D7E tractor appears to be too small for constant heavy clearing operations as a Reme Plow.

(b) EVALUATION: During clearing operations in heavy jungle, the D7E tractor must run at full throttle constantly to develop the necessary power. This constant full throttle operation causes overheating despite maintenance efforts and subsequent early engine failure. As of this time the 60th Land Clearing Company has eight of thirty tractors derelined for engine failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a larger tractor (either D8 or D9 series) be tested and evaluated in the light of less down time for the same acreage cut per week.

(13) Duration of SL/R Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Information obtained from imagery flown during three hour SL/R missions was found to be unsatisfactory.

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(b) EVALUATION: One (1) three hour mission was not effective because the SLR was picking up the same images twice within the time period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The ASTA Platoon found that more targets were detected by splitting the mission in half and running a mission of one and one half hours duration early at night and another the same length several hours later.

(14) Airlift of the 27' Bridge Erection Boat.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is possible, in the RVN theatre of operations, to lift the 27' bridge erection boat as one unit with the CH-47 in spite of high ambient temperatures.

(b) EVALUATION: Previously this Division airlifted the 27' Bridge Erection Boat in two sections. Actual testing with CH-47 proved that the entire boat could be airlifted with the stern cradle in place.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In the future, the 27' boats should be airlifted in one piece. If the boat is to be set anywhere but in the water, the stern cradle should remain attached to preclude damage to the rudders and propellers.

(15) Repair of Culverts.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted that much time and effort is wasted in repairing partially destroyed culverts by just replacing the damaged section.

(b) EVALUATION: On Hwy 16 one particular culvert south of Tan Uyen has been partially destroyed by enemy activity several times. Various methods of repair have been utilized. Removal of the damaged section and replacing only what was damaged proved to be a time consuming and frustrating experience. Due to the overburden (approx 8 ft) the roadside continually caved in creating a dangerous working environment. Therefore, it was decided to destroy the entire length of culvert using demolitions and install a complete culvert. 40 lb cratering charges were placed at five foot intervals along the culvert at a depth of six feet. Bangalore torpedoes were inserted into the remaining culvert and all explosives were detonated simultaneously. The explosion cleared the old culvert and opened the area for installation of the new culvert. A minimum of hand work was required to finish the area preparation. The new culvert, 48" dia x 42' long, was lowered into the hole and back filling and grading produced a truly professional job.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In the repair of partially destroyed culvert with thick overburden, the use of demolitions in the manner described can produce a meaningful saving of time and effort in restoring the roadway to full capability.

(16) Radio Terminal Set AN/GRC-163.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 121st Sig Bn conducted a test of the AN/GRC-163 Radio Terminal Sets (16 Jan-31 Jan) with the major problem area being the lack of equipment spares or component back-up.

(b) EVALUATION: The results of the test are as follows: The general acceptance of the equipment by operating personnel and user is very favorable. Based on its performance during the test, the AN/GRC-163 is an excellent piece of communications equipment to perform the function for which it was designed; however, the following deficiencies were noted:

1. The Technical Manual does not provide sufficient detail on the equipment.

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2. The interconnecting cables (CX-11607/TCC) are easily broken.
  3. System outage alarm is too loud.
  4. Lack of equipment spares.
- (c) RECOMMENDATION: That the testing results be studied for possible corrections of the mentioned deficiencies.

**(17) Testing of High Gain Antennas OE-15/TRC.**

(a) OBSERVATION: A significant improvement in signal level and general system quality was noted when the high gain antennas were in use. A test was established to compare the operational efficiency of the high gain antenna OE-15/TRC with that of the standard AN/TRC-24 antenna, AT-414/TRC, utilizing dipoles AT-413/TRC.

(b) EVALUATION: The test took place between Lai Khe and Di An using C-Band equipment. Antenna height at Lai Khe was 116 feet and at Di An 70 feet, with horizontal polarization. The test was conducted in four phases, (1) both terminals with the standard antennas, (2) and (3) alternating standard and high gain antennas at each site, and (4) both terminals using the high gain antenna. The results of the test showed a marked increase in the quality of the system when the OE-15/TRC high gain antennas were used. An increase of as much as 8 microamps in signal level was noted when the high gain antennas were used at both terminals in place of standard AN/TRC-24 antennas. Another good feature of the high gain antenna is that only one dipole adjustment is necessary to cover an entire band. A feature that subtracts from the usefulness of the antenna, however, is the fact that the antennas for transmit and receive sides require two antenna masts for installation in the field.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The antenna will probably be most useful when used in semi-permanent and permanent installations, such as mounted on an AB-216 tower. The OE-15/TRC high gain antenna is a worthwhile improvement to the Division Communications System.

**(18) Emergency Antennas.**

(a) OBSERVATION: Need for quick erectable emergency antenna for field use.

(b) EVALUATION: Night Defensive Positions (NDPs) have a need for an emergency antenna that can be quickly elevated to heights of 35-40 feet. The need for this derives from the extreme vulnerability of currently used J-292 antenna masts to hostile fire. On several occasions, communications with remote NDPs have been lost because of destruction of the antennas. The requirement exists to be able to re-establish communications immediately without leaving a bunker position under attack. The whip antenna commonly available for field radios is not adequate for this requirement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an emergency antenna be developed that will allow erection to suitable heights from a protected position. With the limited facilities available in the 1st Infantry Division, a lightweight, twin-lead antenna was carried aloft by a hydrogen-filled meteorological balloon. Reliable communications were possible using such arrangement under non-hostile conditions. This approach does not appear amenable to field use unless a small lightweight source of helium were made available. The balloon also appears quite vulnerable to hostile fire until elevated to heights of nominally forty feet.

**(19) Closed Loop System.**

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(a) OBSERVATION: At the present time the Closed Loop System provides a DX system for component signal equipment only.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/MRC-54 Radio Relay Repeater and the AN/MRC-69 Radio Terminal are in need of complete rewiring of the electrical and electronic systems. The Closed Loop System has provided excellent results for the exchange of the components of the above mentioned items, but the shelters are in need of re-air. These major end items have been operational for over 25,000 hours in Vietnam; consequently, they are in need of re-building.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is suggested that a similar type system to the present closed loop be initiated for major end items of signal equipment.

c. (C) Training.

(1) Demolitions Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: While there are no EOD or demolition personnel assigned at Brigade and Battalion level, those units have daily requirements to demolish VC positions and to destroy enemy ammunition.

(b) EVALUATION: The units of the Brigades have successfully trained their own personnel to perform EOD and demolition missions. Their training has been on the spot and has proven itself in daily application. The destruction of enemy positions and ammunition works to the great disadvantage of the VC since it is far easier and requires much less time to destroy a position or cache than it does to construct the position or supply the cache. In addition, the use of unit personnel to perform these special tasks increases the effectiveness of that unit by eliminating the necessity of holding in place until specialists are called to perform the same tasks.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all FMAF train and use their own personnel for demolition missions.

(2) Helicopter Sling Load Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Aviators arriving in the Division need additional helicopter sling load training. New arrivals have not flown for an extended period of time (normally over forty-five days), and have received only a minimum of training in this area.

(b) EVALUATION: Missions involving resupply, in many instances, require the helicopter to hover out of ground effect (OGE). Some landing areas are limited to the extent that hovering OGE or vertical descents are the only procedures applicable unless the load can be sling carried.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Training in sling load operations is presently in progress for all UH-1 pilots. A review in sling load operations will be included in each 90-day standardization check ride, which all assigned aviators are required to complete. A sling load using a A-22 cargo bag is now under consideration for use in resupply missions.

d. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Collecting Agencies.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC/VCI KIAs during this period were in great part a result of well planned ambushes around target hamlets. Information gleaned from local sources, i.e., Village Chiefs, RF/FF forces in the area, and farmers working in the surrounding rice paddies produced timely intelligence that prompted these ambushes.

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- (b) EVALUATION: Capitalizing on "local" intelligence proved to be an essential part of the VCI neutralization program. It enabled unit commanders to position ambushes which denied the enemy access to the target hamlets.
- (c) RECOMMENDATION: Unit commanders should know "who's in the know" in the villages. If units are operating in the area for any length of time, they should establish constant liaison with local inhabitants. They are the people who can provide leads, who can help pinpoint local enemy activity.

**(2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Platoon.**

(a) OBSERVATION: In order to support the 1-4 Cav role in the APC, it was necessary to develop a unit with the sole mission of seeking intelligence of VC Infrastructure, enemy hiding places and enemy caches.

(b) EVALUATION: At the start of the APC, the Squadron's VCI Platoon was organized consisting of 12 US Infantrymen, 10 Kit Carson Scouts (former VC), 1 US aidman, and a US Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Leader. When available, a team of National Police were attached to the platoon. The VCI Platoon accomplished its mission by establishing a security base with one US Infantry team. After the security was established, another US team searched the area looking for physical signs of VC activity while the Kit Carson Scouts broke down into two man teams and talked to the villagers in their homes and in the fields. For additional discussion, see item (8) (Snatch Operations) in section on Operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This type of operation be continued since it has been extremely successful.

**(3) VC Road Mining Tactics.**

(a) OBSERVATION: During December 1968 and January 1969, the VC have employed what appears to be a change in road mining tactics.

(b) DISCUSSION: Almost all mines located adjacent to or on an MSR and destroyed by elements of this command have been emplaced directly on or immediately off the shoulder of major roads. This could be connected to the fact that security vehicles accompanying minesweep parties, such as tanks and APCs have the habit of parking directly on or immediately off the shoulder of a given MSR, while providing security for the mine-sweep elements. Recently the enemy has emplaced mines directly opposite each other, i.e. one mine on the right side and one mine on the left side of the road. While engineers are filling and repairing the crater on one side of the road traffic is usually one way, and channeled to the opposite side of the road, which normally results in the detonation of the second mine. This new tactic has resulted in the combat loss of one tank, one 5 ton dump truck, several other vehicles and several US WHA.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In sweep operations utmost attention must be directed to the immediate vicinity of detected or detonated mines with particular emphasis on the shoulder of the road where vehicles would have a tendency to go around the previously detonated mine.

**e. (C) Logistics.**

**(1) Quarterly Maintenance Service for Track Vehicles.**

(a) OBSERVATION: Quarterly maintenance service for track vehicles was performed during the reporting period by both mechanized Infantry Battalions. The 2-2 Inf (M) conducted quarterly services for company size units during a three day stand down from tactical operations. The 1-16 Inf (M)

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initiated a platoon quarterly maintenance service. Platoons were brought in for a five day stand down period.

(b) EVALUATION: The platoon size stand down was found to be superior to the company size stand down. It allowed for more time to be devoted by the organizational mechanics with least interference to normal operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The platoon size quarterly maintenance program be considered as the standard procedure for mechanized units.

(2) Transistors for Power Convertors for FPS-4 Radars.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many radar failures were attributed to transistor part no. 2N1358 FSN 5961-846-7338.

(b) EVALUATION: Power transistor Q802 (factory installed transistor 2N1358) can be interchanged with 2N2210 FSN 5961-892-3800 without any circuit changes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Distribution of this information in order to improve availability of the FPS-4 radar.

(3) Towing Pintle, 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton Trucks.

(a) OBSERVATION: The towing pintle on 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks becomes loose after prolonged use.

(b) EVALUATION: The nut that holds the towing pintle on the vehicle has too much play.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The nut can be tightened and will remain tight if the hole for the cotter key is moved back or a washer is placed in front of the safety nut.

(4) Truck, 1/4 ton M151.

(a) OBSERVATION: Excessive noise in rear differential of 1/4 ton, M151.

(b) EVALUATION: Differentials for the M151 are difficult to obtain. The rear and front differential are interchangeable. Interchanging the front and rear differentials will reduce the noise and provide longer life.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Distribution of this information in order to improve condition of excessive noise in rear differential of 1/4 ton, M151.

(5) Tractor, Full Tracked, Caterpillar, Model D7E.

(a) OBSERVATION: Removal of radiators from Caterpillar D7E tractor is a delicate operation.

(b) EVALUATION: Control of the radiator while being lifted out is critical and damage can easily occur.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When lifting radiators out of the Caterpillar D7E tractor it is best to back the wrecker up to the tractor so the wrecker is parallel to the blade. This way the boom does not have to be extended as far and it is easier to control the wrecker.

(6) Tractor, Full Tracked Caterpillar Model D7E.

(a) OBSERVATION: High number of operator casualties during land clearing operations resulting from enemy booby traps.

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AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

(b) EVALUATION: An open gap between the tractor engine and the front edge of the cab guard allowed shrapnel from booby traps to enter the cab and cause numerous wounds to the lower portions of the operator's body. To eliminate this problem, a rectangle of short steel, sufficient in thickness to defeat shrapnel, was welded to the tractor cab and deck on either side of the engine. The height of the shield was designed to provide maximum protection from the shrapnel without obstructing the operator's field of vision or causing difficulty in entering or leaving the cab.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all tractors equipped for and participating in land clearing operations be modified in a similar manner.

(7) OH-6A Blade Life.

(a) OBSERVATION: Protective tape is inadequate in prolonging blade life on the OH-6A.

(b) EVALUATION: The primary cause for the replacement of OH-6A rotor blades is excessive erosion of the leading edges. This erosion during the dry season in RVN can reduce the service life of main rotor blades to less than 400 hours with normal replacement required between 500-600 hours. This situation exists for two reasons: non-availability of the tape and the short life of the contractor supplied protective tape. The use of substitutes has proven unsuccessful, and the value of the taping procedures itself as a deterrent to erosion is questionable.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Development and procurement of a blade with sufficient erosion resistance to achieve TBO service life.

(8) High Frequency Vibration in the OH-6A.

(a) OBSERVATION: The primary cause of high frequency vibration in the OH-6A is a tail rotor out of balance condition.

(b) EVALUATION: The tail rotor was originally designed as a factory balanced item (no balancing equipment required for field use). This tail rotor has not proven satisfactory for its programmed service life. Replacement was required when erosion on bearing wear exceeded specified tolerances at a time considerably short of service life. The resulting demand for tail rotors was reduced by the development of a tail rotor balance kit for the field. At present the kits supplied by the contractor are controlled by Hughes Tool Company representatives. The resulting "waiting list" created by the short supply of kits has increased aircraft down time considerably.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Procurement of sufficient numbers of those kits to allow issue to the direct support level.

f. (C) Organization.

(1) Organization of VCI Platoon in Pacification Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Recom Platoon can be augmented to accomplish the missions of the VCI Platoon.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the Recom Platoon, augmented with Vietnamese National Police and Kit Carson Scouts, can effectively accomplish the mission of the VCI Platoon in a pacification effort. Utilized as an intelligence gathering agency during the day, this platoon can react at night to information received. The VCI Platoon should be mobile so as to visit each target hamlet daily. This discussion should be considered in conjunction with item 8 (Snatch Operations) in Operations Section and item 2 (Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Platoon) in Intelligence Section.

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AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL), (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Recon Platoon be utilized as the VCI Platoon during pacification missions.

(2) Motorized Recon (Battle) Platoon.

(a) OBSERVATION: The infantry battalion has the capability of motorizing its recon platoon.

(b) EVALUATION: A motorized recon platoon provides the infantry battalion commander with a highly mobile strike force capable of rapid reaction when the terrain and the tactical situation permit. One brigade created such a force by assigning six vehicles, including four gun jeeps and one additional jeep from Combat Support Company and one jeep from the battalion communications platoon, to the recon platoon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That infantry battalions consider the feasibility of motorizing their recon platoons.

g. (C) Other.

(1) Tunnel Explorer, Locator, and Communication System (TELACS).

(a) OBSERVATION: Testing of Tunnel Explorer, Locator, and Communication System (TELACS). A unit more suited to superior tunnel communications needs to be manufactured which would lend itself to better contact between above ground and sister elements inside the tunnel complex. Also a more maneuverable and a more universal antenna system should be developed.

(b) EVALUATION: The TELACS System was tested by the Tunnel Rats on 8 Jan 69. This system has both a voice transmission and signal tracking capability. Initial tests showed the system to be too unreliable and bulky for our use. The voice transmission is very distorted and the tracking mode is very time consuming. The system had to be discarded before the whole test was run because the trap doors that were encountered were too small to get through with the equipment strapped on an individual's back.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that this unit be sent back for more research and development, and a more portable and compact unit be developed to meet both signal and maneuverability requirements. Until such time that a suitable unit is developed, a TA-1 telephone and a compass accomplished the communication and mapping requirements in a reliable manner.

(2) Establishment of Friendship Councils.

(a) OBSERVATION: 1st Infantry Division efforts to establish Friendship Councils as part of the Community Relations Program have been frustrated by Vietnamese attitude toward the Councils.

(b) EVALUATION: No Friendship Councils are presently operating. Vietnamese officials in the Districts around base camps are reluctant to help community problems.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis through Vietnamese channels to Province and District officials could generate interest in the Councils. Vietnamese commanders should be urged immediately to promote the Community Relations Program.

(3) Use of PsyOp Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Division PsyOp aircraft is currently allocated to G5 on a four hour daily basis. The ship is scheduled at 1800 hours the day prior.

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AVDB-T (KHD)

SUBJ/LCT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

(b) EVALUATION: The limited time available and the relative inflexibility of the schedule severely hampers the Division's capability to react quickly to exploit PsyOp opportunities (i.e. ralliers).

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the time allocated for Division use of the 6th PsyOps Bn aircraft be increased or that arrangements be made to give a priority to support quick reaction missions, such as ralliers.

(4) Use of Armed Propaganda Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: APTs are GVN controlled and attached to allied units on a mission basis.

(b) EVALUATION: APTs have proved a valuable weapon in the PsyOps arsenal. Their cultural knowledge and past experience with the VC make them a highly valuable and effective media. The people relate easily to them and accept their statements more readily than those broadcast from allied helicopters. They are possibly the most effective means of PsyOps at our disposal. Because of the fact that the APTs are attached to the Division on a mission basis a continuity is lost. If they would be permanently assigned to a unit they could be more easily and widely used. Also by working the same areas an experienced and rapport factor would develop which should add significantly to the effectiveness of their propagandizing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Division be allocated positions to permanently assign APTs, much the same as Kit Carson Scouts.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Lester E. Shotwell*

23 Incl  
1-Organizational Structure  
2-List of Key Commanders -w/d, Hq, DA  
3-Force Disposition  
4-1st Bde Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
5-2d Bde Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
6-3d Bde Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
7-Support Command Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
8-Division Chemical Section Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
9-1st Aviation Bn Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
10-1st Engr Bn Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
11-121st Signal Bn Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
12-1st MP Company Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
13-Movement Schedule Period 31 Oct-10 Nov 68  
14-10 Overlay Boundary Change  
15-10 Overlay 1st Bde TAOI  
16-10 Overlay 2d Bde TAOI  
17-10 Overlay 3d Bde TAOI  
18-10 Overlay 2d & 3d Bde TAOI  
19-Pamphlet Fundamentals of Infantry Tactics -w/d, published earlier as FOR OT RD  
20-Commander's Notes #5, dtd 13 Nov 68  
21-Commander's Notes #6, dtd 3 Dec 68  
22-Commander's Notes #7, dtd 18 Dec 68  
23-Commander's Notes #8, dtd 30 Dec 68

w/d, summarized in division ORLL  
682001

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AVFBC-RE-H (19 Feb 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 12 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375  
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-  
Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for the period ending 31 Jan-  
uary 1969.

2. It should be noted that details of enemy strengths and organization  
presented in this report vary from II FFORCEV order of battle holdings  
for this period. However, the overall evaluation of enemy capabilities  
and dispositions is in accordance with the II FFORCEV estimate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
B.G. MACDONALD  
ILT, AGC  
Asst AG,

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AVHGC-DST (19 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 31 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning controlled infusion program, page 28, paragraph 2a(3); concur in the suggestion to reduce rotational humps by reassessments against special requirements as a partial solution. It is sound resources management to implement any reasonable method of hump reduction. However, such a system is not the sole solution. Generally special requirements are not of sufficient magnitude to reduce major rotational humps.

b. (U) Reference item concerning use of D7E Tractor in clearing operations, page 32, paragraph 2b(12); concur. The Engineer Section is now in the process of securing four D-9 series tractors with Rome Plow kits for evaluation in land clearing operations.

c. (U) Reference item concerning Radio Terminal Set, AN/GRC-163, page 33, paragraph 2b(16). Nonconcur in recommendation. Unit should submit recommended changes to Technical Manual on DA Form 2028 (Recommended changes to DA Publications) directly to CG, US Army Electronics Command, ATTN: AMSEL-MR-NRP-AD, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 07703. Interconnecting cable and system outage alarm problems are proper subjects for unit submission of Equipment Improvement Recommendations (EIR's). With respect to equipment spares, the AN/GRC-163 is type classified as limited Procurement, however, repair parts are readily available through normal supply channels. The unit will be advised of the above.

d. (U) Reference item concerning emergency antennas, page 34, paragraph 2b(18); concur. This is a developmental requirement properly addressed to CG, US Army Electronics Command.

e. (U) Reference item concerning Closed Loop System, page 34, paragraph 2b(19); concur. The problem is recognized. A return and repair program is considered more feasible than closed loop and a survey is currently under way to establish the quantities and types of shelters involved. Upon receipt of survey results, US Army Electronics Command will consider establishment of a return and repair program.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (19 Feb 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

f. (C) Reference item concerning helicopter sling load training, page 35, paragraph 2c(2); concur. External load operations (sling loads) are required on 90-day standardizations. USARV Form 177 lists maneuvers in which a pilot must demonstrate proficiency during in-country orientation and subsequent standardization check rides.

g. (C) Reference item concerning Collecting Agencies, page 35, paragraph d(1); concur. This is a very essential element of acquiring local intelligence. The information will be published in the next edition of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action be taken by DA or USARPAC.

h. (C) Reference item concerning VC Road Mining Tactics, page 36, paragraph d(3); concur. Item will be published in the next edition of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action be taken by DA or USARPAC.

i. (U) Reference item concerning transistors for power converters for PPS-4 Radars, page 37, paragraph 2e(2); concur. The power transistor 2N2210 is a heavier design item that can accept increased power sometimes caused by power surges. It can be interchanged with the 2N1358 transistor. This information will be distributed throughout USARV units by the G-4 Maintenance Division.

j. (U) Reference item concerning truck, 1/4 ton M151, page 37, paragraph 2e(4); nonconcur. Replacement of the rear differentials on 1/4 ton M151 trucks should be done when it has been determined that the rear differential is unserviceable, not just noisy. The front and rear differentials are interchangeable and local commanders can authorize a switch when serviceable differentials are not available. Units will be notified of USARV's position on this subject. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

k. (U) Reference item concerning tractor, full tracked caterpillar, model D7E, page 37, paragraph 2e(6); concur. This recommendation is being applied by several of the Land Clearing Companies. The USARV Engineer will be advised of this modification. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

l. (C) Reference item concerning OH-6A blade life, page 38, paragraph 2e(7); concur. When equipment fails to perform satisfactorily, Equipment Improvement Recommendations (EIR's) should be submitted. It is through EIR's that Aviation Support Command is able to take corrective action.

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AVHGC-DST (19 Feb 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

m. (C) Reference item concerning high frequency vibration in the OH-6A, page 38, paragraph 2e(8); concur. Action has been taken to procure sufficient numbers of balancing kits for issue to direct support level maintenance units. To date, 14 kits have been issued.

n. (U) Reference item concerning Tunnel Explorer, Locator, and Communications Systems (TELACS), page 39, paragraph 2g(1); concur. Observations and recommendations are being incorporated with comments of other units. The final evaluation report on suitability of this equipment will be forwarded to USARPAC as a separate action.

o. (U) Reference item concerning establishment of Friendship Councils, page 39, paragraph 2g(2); concur. Vietnamese command interest is an effective means for influencing local GVN officials.

p. (U) Reference item concerning use of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) aircraft, page 39, paragraph 2g(3); concur. Priorities for allocation of aircraft hours should be adjusted for high impact missions.

q. (U) Reference item concerning use of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), page 40, paragraph 2g(4); concur. The recurring employment of APT's in the same area does lead to the team gaining increased credibility in a locale. However, units cannot be allocated spaces for APT's until an APT employment program is initiated for US units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. D. Wilson*  
C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Inf Div  
II FFV

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GPOP-DT (19 Feb 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Inf Div for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C.L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst CIO

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ORGANIZATIONAL  
STRUCTURE



Incl 1

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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## ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

## Assigned Units

HHC, 1st Inf Div	2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf
701st Maint Bn	1st Bn, 26th Inf
1st S&T Bn	41st Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
121st Sig Bn	HHC, 2d Bde
1st Engr Bn	2d Bn, 16th Inf
1st Avn Bn	1st Bn, 18th Inf
1st Med Bn	2d Bn, 18th Inf
1st MI Det	35th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
HHC and Band, Spt Comd	61st Inf Plat (Combat Tracker)
1st Admin Co .	HHC, 3d Bde
266th Crl Plat	1st Bn, (Mech), 16th Inf
242d Crl Det	1st Bn, 28th Inf
43d PI Det	2d Bn, 28th Inf
44th PI Det	HHB, Div Arty
17th Mil Hist Det	1st Bn, 5th Arty
Co F, 52d Inf (LRP)	1st Bn, 7th Arty
1st Sqdn, 4th Cav	2d Bn, 33d Arty
HHC, 1st Bde	8th Bn, 6th Arty
1st Bn, 2d Inf	1st MP Co

## Attached Units

Co B, 2d Bn, 34th Armor	317th Avn Det
314th Avn Det	322d Avn Det
340th Avn Det	

## OPCON Units

A Btry, 5th Bn, 2d Arty (-)	D Btry, 71st Arty (2 Quad 50)
11th Armored Cav Regt (-)	1st Plat, I Btry, 29th Arty (6 Sect)

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**FORCE DISPOSITION  
NOVEMBER 1968**

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1-2	LOCAL SEC QFS LAI KHE	ROUTE SECURITY QFS ROUTE ZINC (RP 1A, 2A), BEN CAT TO PHUOC VINH												LOCAL SEC OPS LAI KHE												QFCN 1ST CAV DIV (AM)											
2-2	ROUTE FROM SECURITY QFS PHUOC VINH												ROUTE; SLC QFS ET VINH PACIFICATION QFS CHINH LUU												ROUTINE; SLC QFS ET VINH PACIFICATION QFS CHINH LUU												
1-16	LOCAL SEC QFS LAI KHE	POPULATION CONTROL, NICE DENIAL QFS VIC DI AN, PHU LOT												RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCH R'S MTT												RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCH R'S MTT											
2-16	1-18 INSTALLATION SECURITY THU DOU												INSTLLATION SECURITY THU DOU												INSTLLATION SECURITY THU DOU												
1-18	INSTLLATION SECURITY PHUOC VINH	OPCUN 1ST CAV DIV (AM)												RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCH R'S MTT												RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCH R'S MTT											
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1-26	RIF AND AP QFS VIC TONG LE CHON	LOCAL SEC QFS LAI KHE												RIF SEC OPS LAI KHE												RIF AND AP QFS LAI KHE											
1-26	RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCHER'S MTT	RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCHER'S MTT												LOCAL SEC OPS LAI KHE												RIF AND NIGHT PATROL QFS CATCHER'S MTT											
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DOD DR 5200.10

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FORCE DISPOSITION  
DECEMBER 1968

1-16 RUMBLE SEC 03 MUNIZ, CIVILIGATION OF CHAN LNU  
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REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS 2-36

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INSTALLATION SECURITY HQ DOC									
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RIF AND NIGHT RIF TSAR-2010 AND VTC (FUNCTION CITY)

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**FORCE DISPOSITION**

**JANUARY 1969**

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IMMEDIATE  
PRIORITY      MOVEMENT SCHEDULE Period 31 Oct-10 Nov 68  
CG 1ST INF DIV LAI KHE RVN

DISTR:  
1-ADC-M  
1-ADC-S  
1-Cofs  
1-G1  
1-G2  
1-G3  
1-G3 PLANS  
1-G3 O&T  
1-G3 OPS

CO 1ST BDE QUAN LOI RVN  
CO 3D BDE LAI KHE RVN (COURIER)  
CO DIV ARTY LAI KHE RVN (COURIER)  
CO 3D BDE 1ST CAV DIV (AM) QUAN LOI RVN  
  
INFO: CG II FFV LONG BINH RVN  
CG 1ST CAV DIV (AM) PHOUC VINH RVN  
CO 2D BDE DI AN RVN  
CO 11TH ACR (FWD) RVN  
CO SPT COMD DI AN RVN  
CO 1ST AVN BN PHU LOI RVN  
CO 1ST ENGR BN LAI KHE RVN (COURIER)  
CO 121ST SIG BN LAI KHE RVN (COURIER)  
CO 1ST SQDN 4TH CAV DI AN RVN  
CO 11TH AVN BN PHU LOI RVN

2-G4  
1-G5  
1-DTO  
1-ADE  
1-AAE  
1-ALO  
1-DAO  
1-DSO  
1-CHAP  
1-SURG  
1-ACC  
1-LCCC  
1-PN  
1-CML  
1-IO  
1-IG  
1-SJA  
1-AG  
1-FAO  
1-SSO  
1-HQ, COMDT  
1-17TH MHD  
1-FSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L      AVDB-TP

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT SCHEDULE (U)

REFERENCE: SECRET 1ST INF DIV OPLAN 13-68 MULE SKINNER (U)

1. (C) THIS MESSAGE ESTABLISHES THE MOVEMENT PLANNING CONCEPT AND PROPOSED MOVEMENT SCHEDULE FOR 1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV UNITS FROM 31 OCT 68 TO 10 NOV 68.
2. (C) CO, 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) ASSUMES DEFENSE AND SCTY RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUAN LOI BASE CAMP VICE CO, 1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV EFFECTIVE 011200H NOV 68.
3. (C) THE 3D BDE/1ST CAV DIV (AM) BEGAN FIELD OPERATIONS IN AO OWENS AS OF 310800H OCT 68 AND WILL EXTEND OPERATIONS TO THE WEST OF QUAN LOI O/A 2 NOV 68.
4. (C) IT IS PLANNED THAT O/A 4 NOV 68, CG, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INTERNAL SCTY AND DEFENSE OF PHOUC VINH BASE CAMP VICE CO, 3D BDE, 1ST INF DIV.
5. (C) IT IS PLANNED THAT O/A 051200H NOV 68, CG, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF KEY INSTALLATIONS AND FOR AREA OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN AO GARRY VICE PHOUC VINH AND AO FALCON VICE CG, 1ST INF DIV (OVERLAY PASSED SEPARATELY).  
O/A 051200H NOV 68, TRP/1-11 ACR LOCATED AT LOC NINH AND THE 1-18 INF BN FROM 1ST INF DIV CONDUCTING PHOUC VINH DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITHIN AO GARRY WILL BECOME OPCON TO 1ST CAV DIV (AM). AT THE SAME TIME 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) IS EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED FROM OPCON, 1ST INF DIV AND REVERT TO PARENT 1ST CAV DIV (AM) CONTROL.

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**CONFIDENTIAL OCT 68**  
PG 1 OF 3 PGS

JOSEPH A. SHEA DM 109 /s/ William T. Parks MAJ GS Dep G3  
MAJ, GS /t/ LOUIS C. MENETRAY, LTC, GS, ACOFS, G3

Incl 15

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PRIORITY

6. (C) 1ST BDE, 1ST INF DIV WILL COMMENCE EXITING AO BADGER THRU TONG LE CHON TO LAI KHE ON 5 NOV 68. AO BADGER WILL TERMINATE 061800H NOV 68 AFTER THE 1ST BDE HAS CLOSED OUT OF AO. ON 6 NOV 68, 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV ELEMENTS WILL CONDUCT A RELIEF IN PLACE OF 1ST INF DIV ELEMENTS OCCUPYING FSPB THUNDER III AND THUNDER IV ALONG HIGHWAY QL 13. O/A 061800H NOV 68, 3D BDE/1ST CAV DIV (AM) WILL ASSUME SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIGHWAY QL 13 IN AO FALCON.

7. (C) O/A 7 NOV 68, TRP/1-11 ACR WILL BE RELEASED FROM OPCON, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) AND REVERT TO PARENT UNIT CONTROL.

8. (C) IT IS PLANNED THAT CG, 1ST CAV DIV (AM) WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR AO HAWK O/A 7 NOV 68 VICE CG, 1ST INF DIV CO/1-26 INF AT SONG BE WILL RETURN TO LAI KHE O/A 7 NOV 68.

9. (C) THE FOLLOWING REFLECT MOVEMENT PLANS FOR 1ST BDE,

1ST INF DIV:

UNIT <u>ASSIGNED</u>	ELEMENTS. <u>MOVE</u>	UNIT <u>CLOSES</u>	AT <u>LOCATION</u>
HHC, 1ST BDE	8 NOV	10 NOV	LK
1-2 INF	30 OCT	6 NOV	LK
1-26 INF (-)	2 NOV	7 NOV	LK
1-28 INF	2 NOV	4 NOV	LK
1-5 ARTY	2 NOV	10 NOV	LK
A1 ISPD	2 NOV	9 NOV	UNK (LK)
C/1 M.D.	3 NOV	8 NOV	LK
36 SIG BN	-	-	STAYS QL
ASP	3 NOV	3 NOV	DI AN

ATTACHED

D/701ST MAINT BN	8 NOV	8 NOV	LK
1 PLAT/1 MP CO	4 NOV	9 NOV	LK
B/1 SET BN	8 NOV	9 NOV	LK
A/1 ENGR BN	31 OCT	2 NOV	LK
1 PLAT/B/121 SIG BN	7 NOV	9 NOV	LK
C/8-6 ARTY BN	7 NOV	9 NOV	LK
G/168 ENGR BN	-	-	STAYS QL

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<u>UNIT OPCON</u>	<u>ELEMENTS MOVE</u>	<u>UNIT CLOSES</u>	<u>AT LOCATION</u>
81ST QM			STAYS QL
6/27 ARTY BN			STAYS QL
1 PLAT/337 RRU CO	2 NOV	7 NOV	LK
32 DET/5 WEA SQ			STAYS QL
19 TAAS (FAC)	7 NOV	10 NOV	LK
8 AERIAL PT			STAYS QL
322 AVN DET			STAYS QL
507TH ENGR FIRE DEPT			STAYS QL
MI DET	2 NOV	7 NOV	LK
APO			STAYS QL
GP-4.			

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

13 November 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #5, Accidental Shooting of Vietnamese Civilians (U)

**SEE DISTRIBUTION**

1. (U) Reference: 1st Infantry Division CONFIDENTIAL message, AVDB-TP 6765, Talbott Sends, subject as above, dated 270830 October 1968.

2. (C) To counter the increased enemy threat, almost all rural hamlets under GVN control are organizing and arming civilian members of People's Self-Defense Groups. In a recent unfortunate incident that occurred in another area, an armed member of a People's Self-Defense Group was observed entering a house which was subsequently engaged by a gunship, injuring two children in the house. Similar incidents involving the more poorly uniformed Popular Forces soldiers have also occurred.

3. (U) Tactical unit commanders at all levels are enjoined to exercise utmost discretion during conduct of military operations to avoid the shooting of friendly Vietnamese civilians. Incidents such as the one mentioned have an adverse effect upon the morale of our Vietnamese friends and upon the image of the US military.

4. (U) All commanders will place concerted command emphasis on preventing incidents which cause feelings of resentment toward our units and our presence in general.

5. (U) The contents of this message and the message referred to in paragraph 1 will be discussed with and disseminated to all commands down to and including platoon level and to all aviation personnel to include individual aviators. In addition, the possibility of mistaking local Vietnamese forces for the enemy will be emphasized at all commanders' conferences and especially to all new incoming personnel.

/s/ Orwin C. Talbott  
ORWIN C. TALBOTT  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 96345

AVDB-CG

3 December 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #6, Fire Hazards in Field Locations

See DISTRIBUTION

1. In the past 12 months, there have been two major fires in fire support bases, one in the 25th Infantry Division area in December 1967 and the recent one in FSB Oran.
  - a. The Oran fire was ignited by a smoke grenade used to make an LZ for an incoming CH-47. The downwash from the helicopter rotors fanned the smoke grenade, caused the grass to ignite in the area, and the wind quickly spread the fire through the FSB.
  - b. The resulting conflagration caused extensive loss of equipment. The situation could have been worse had the enemy been in position to take advantage of the confusion. Additionally, it is conceivable that the enemy could deliberately set a similar fire which could result in similar losses and then follow up with a heavy ground attack.
  - c. We have, in effect, become our own worst enemy. We have done to our own FSB what the enemy has been unable to do.
2. Throughout the dry season, we will be operating in areas that are covered with dry undergrowth. It is essential that commanders at all levels direct their personal attention to the matter of fire hazards in their areas of operations, landing zones, night defensive positions, and fire support bases. I will expect immediate, positive, and imaginative action to preclude a recurrence of a fire of this type in the 1st Division area.
3. The following procedures will be instituted as a minimum:
  - a. Insure that all officers and key noncommissioned officers read this Commander's Note.
  - b. Orient all incoming personnel on the contents of this Commander's Note.

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3 December 1968

SUBJ.LCT: Commander's Notes #6, Fire Hazards in Field Locations

c. Unit commanders will insure that written SOP's are published for the guidance of all personnel of their commands. These SOP's will include, but not be limited to, coverage of the following:

- (1) Deliberate burn-off of potential landing zones, night defensive positions and fire support bases using artillery WP rounds, preplanned USAF napalm strikes, and helicopter-delivered WP or thermite grenades.
- (2) Consideration of weather and time of day for preplanned burn-off.
- (3) Careful selection of landing zones to avoid those which offer fire hazards.
- (4) Limit use of white phosphorus rounds, gunship rockets, or pyrotechnics in landing zone "preps" to areas where fires are not likely to start.
- (5) Cautions for use of flares of all types. Trip flares must be securely mounted at spots which are fire safe.
- (6) Cutting of fire lanes within and around field locations.
- (7) Rakes, brooms, shovels, fire extinguishers and other tools for fighting grass fires kept on hand.
- (8) Attention to the storage and separation of pyrotechnics, explosives, and other combustible materials.
- (9) Designation of fire control officers and NCO's.
- (10) Controlled burning around perimeters.
- (11) Maximum use of panel marking sets in lieu of smoke grenades. These panels may be removed just before the helicopter lands to preclude sucking the panel up into the rotor blades or they may be securely staked in place and checked frequently.
- (12) Positive control over the use of smoke grenades when their use is required. The smoke grenades will be placed in a shell hole or in a prepared hole one to two feet deep. Additionally, the smoke grenades will, where necessary, be wired to steel stakes to prevent blowing by helicopters.
- (13) A positive plan of action in the event of an unavoidable fire.

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SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #6, Fire Hazards in Field Locations

4. I am firmly convinced that, with proper planning and close command attention to the points enumerated, the hazards of fire in field locations can be properly and thoroughly controlled. I expect to see these policies in effect during my visits to the field locations and desire to be briefed on your individual SOP's and implementation thereof during these visits.

/s/ Orwin G. Talbott  
ORWIN G. TALBOT  
Major General  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 96345

AVDB-T

18 December 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #7, Command Responsibility in Air Assault Operations

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The most demanding and potentially dangerous method of introducing troops to the battlefield is the air assault. This method offers very significant advantages but demands the utmost professionalism in both planning and execution. I want to express my absolute intention to maintain the division's traditional highest standards by emphasizing the responsibilities of commanders at all levels in the execution of 1st Infantry Division air assault operations. These remarks amplify the guidance given in the Fundamentals of 1st Infantry Division Tactics.

2. In a company sized or smaller air assault the responsibilities of the company commander in planning and execution include the following:

a. Standard troop leading procedures must be followed, to include: issuing a warning order, performing a reconnaissance, coordinating as necessary, issuing an order, supervising preparations, and conducting a rehearsal.

b. Planning peculiar to air assault operations requires:

(1) Reporting airlift strength to controlling headquarters S3 Ar.

(2) Preparing aircraft loading plans.

(3) Insuring dispersal of key personnel and equipment throughout the lifts.

(4) Coordinating available fire support.

c. The responsibilities of the company commander in the execution phase of the air assault are:

(1) To insure unit meets its pick-up time.

(2) Insure that personnel of all lifts exit the aircraft on both sides immediately upon touchdown. Aircraft should be on the ground ten seconds at the very most.

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SUBJ-CT: Commander's Notes #7, Command Responsibility in Air Assault Operations

(3) Insure personnel in the first lift ("Christmas Tree") rapidly assume their respective positions 10-15 meters from touchdown points facing outward in all directions prepared to return any fire directed at the lift ships. The first lift lands in an extended staggered trail formation.

(4) A report of LZ hot or cold given to the command and control aircraft just as soon as possible.

(5) Insure that the five security elements immediately mark their positions with continuous smoke or panels to identify the limits of the secure area for all remaining flights and for fire support means. Special care must be taken to insure no fires are started by smoke grenades. For long "insertions" security element smoke may be discontinued between lifts and reinstated "on call".

(6) Insure security element marks the touchdown point for the lead ship of each succeeding flight. Smoke for lead ship must be of a different color than that used to mark security elements. If LZ conditions permit, all flights except the first will land in trail formation within the security elements ("Christmas Tree").

(7) Insure that each platoon rapidly clears the LZ, moves into the wood line (if available), and occupies its assembly area. It is imperative that dispersion be maintained during this phase of the operation and that there be no delay.

(8) Insure that, as succeeding units move through the security elements, they mark their forward position with smoke and continue to mark forward outline with smoke until termination of the assault.

d. If the LZ is "hot" the security elements will be consolidated in perimeter on the LZ to permit maximum air and artillery to be expended prior to landing additional troops. Commanders must insure they are prepared to react quickly on the ground and with supporting fires.

3. The responsibilities of the company commander in an air assault of two or more companies are the same as that for single company assaults except that coordination must be made with adjacent units.

4. The battalion commander's responsibilities in the conduct of an air assault of a company or smaller size force are also divided into two phases:

a. In the planning phase standard troop leading procedures are required including that planning peculiar to air assault operations. The ground mission is primary and the basis for all other requirements. The reverse planning sequence begins with the preparation of the ground tactical plan.

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SUBJECT: Commander's Note #7, Command Responsibility in Air Assault Operations

Subsequent planning should include:

- (1) Assault landing plan which as a minimum should contain: the timing of the operation, LZ selection (not finalized until the completion of the ground tactical plan), a fire support plan including air strikes and TAC air cap, artillery, gunships, and smoke screens.
- (2) A movement plan including a flight route, orbit area, and gunship escort.
- (3) A marshalling plan covering PZ selection, times, aircraft loads, number of aircraft, and dispersion of key personnel and equipment throughout lifts.
- (4) Battalion must forward "prep card" information to brigade S3 Air. The "prep card" contains:
  - a. Schematic of LZ area including locations of tactical air, artillery, and gunship preparations, orbit area, flight path into and from LZ, grid reference, and north directional arrow.
  - b. Location of LZ grid coordinates.
  - c. Communication data.
  1. Frequency and identification of assault unit.
  2. Frequency and identification of AO.
  3. Frequency and identification of ANC.
  4. Frequency and identification of FAC.
  - d. Tactical air support (confirmed).
  1. Number of sorties.
  2. Ordnance.
  - e. Sequence of events.
  1. Weather decision time.
  2. Air strike (start).
  3. Air strike (complete).

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SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #7, Command Responsibility in Air Assault Operations

4. Artillery preparation (start).
5. Artillery preparation (shifts).
6. Gunship preparation.
7. Touchdown.
8. Grid coordinates of orbit area.
9. Grid coordinates of blocking fires.

b. In the assault phase the battalion commander is responsible for and controls the air assault and all fires until the ground tactical commander (company commander) is on the ground with adequate communications. He also closely monitors those items specified in paragraph 2c above.

5. For the conduct of an air assault of a two company or larger size force, the battalion commander's responsibilities are again divided into two phases:

- a. The planning phase of air assaults of two or more companies is basically the same as that for single company assaults except that the battalion commander must specify coordination between adjacent companies.
- b. The assault phase differs in that when the battalion is committed (two or more companies) the brigade commander must be responsible for planning and controlling the air assault and all supporting fires. He will retain this responsibility until the battalion commander is established on the ground with adequate communications. In addition, brigade commanders approve and/or modify as needed plans submitted by battalion. If inadequate time precludes normal battalion planning, brigade will accomplish planning steps outlined above. These plans are then forwarded to division for approval and include the elements of information necessary to compile the "prep card" and other planning considerations. Provision must be made for alternate target areas in which tactical air caps can be expended if not needed in the LZ area. In the execution phase of any air assault, brigade commanders monitor the progress of the operation, constantly prepared to exploit any development.

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18 December 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #7, Command Responsibility in Air Assault Operations

6. The preceding comments comprise guidance on command responsibilities in the planning and execution of air assault operations by elements of the 1st Infantry Division.

/s/ Orwin C. Talbott  
ORWIN C. TALBOTT  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO 96345

AVDB-TF

30 December 1968

SUBJECT: Commander's Notes #8, Finding the Enemy

Sec D. INTRODUCTION

1. It is a well known military principle that in order to destroy the enemy you must first find him. A considerable sum of money, time, and effort has been expended in developing techniques and equipment which will locate the enemy. However, the best equipment cannot replace the individual soldier on the ground, who has been trained to recognize the signs of enemy presence and the proximity of enemy base camps.
2. As a rule, enemy base camps are located in areas of heavy canopied jungle and dense undergrowth with a readily available water supply. These camps are usually accessible by trail and located within two to three kilometers of the jungle periphery. Some of the specific indicators are:
  - a. Trails and paths: Aerial reconnaissance is a good method of detecting trails. Converging trails or trails that lead into but do not exit a heavily vegetated area are good indicators of a base camp. Other signs to look for are single trails branching into smaller trails, grass beaten down to form a path, and grass beaten down in a circular area to form a sleeping position or observation post. The soldier on the ground can determine the type of activity by examining the trail for footprints, bicycle tracks, oxcart tracks, etc. The age of the track may be determined by checking the color of the broken grass, branches, and leaves along the trail. Vegetation wilts quickly and begins to dry after two to four hours of tropical sun. The hardness of footprints and tracks around muddy or moist areas of the trail is another way to determine the age of the track. The enemy has been known to bury communications wire along the side of trails so do not overlook this possibility.
  - b. Cut trees: Cut trees or stumps indicate that a possible base area may be within 200 to 500 meters. Often the enemy will attempt to hide or age the cut by covering it with leaves or rubbing dirt into it. Small trees are usually cut to make fish or animal traps, while larger trees are used for storage racks and bunkers. The enemy often cuts blaze marks on trees to mark trails into new base camps or to designate locations of claymores or observation posts inside the camp.

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c. Bunkers or fresh digging: During the construction phase of a base camp, the VC spread the soil over a large area. Often the dirt will be dumped into nearby streams. Detection of these small piles of dirt or scattered soil indicated possible bunkers or tunnels in the area. The discovery of bunkers is a sure sign of a base camp. Before getting this close to the camp you may detect fighting positions with shallow berms which indicate possible observation posts or, if in large numbers, possibly an overnight resting area.

d. Minefield and booby trap markers: Although no standard pattern has been determined, it is known that the VC use markers of some type to identify locations of mines and booby traps in and near their base camps. By being alert for the unusual you may be able to detect some of these markers. Common markers consist of sticks, bamboo, leaves, vines, and stones arranged in various patterns. Often the signs will be no more than a broken branch. In some areas the VC post signs marked with a red "X" or a skull and cross bones and in some areas have been known to post signs written in Vietnamese warning of a mined or booby trapped area.

e. Traps and snares: Good indications of enemy bases are the presence of traps or snares to catch small game. Small fences of interwoven branches with built-in traps are often located 200 to 300 meters from the base camp. Fish traps in streams and ponds are also to be found from 200 to 300 meters from the camp.

f. Other tell-tale signs of VC presence are cooking odors, sounds of wood chopping, crowing roosters, cackling chickens, barking dogs, cleared fields of fire, and latrines just outside the perimeter.

3. Tunnel complexes: Many of the base camps indicators are also located near tunnel complexes. The tunnel complex is often a part of the camp itself. Normally the first characteristic of a tunnel complex is superb camouflage. Entrances and exits are concealed, bunkers are camouflaged and even within the tunnel complex itself side tunnels are concealed, hidden trap doors are prevalent, and dead-end tunnels are utilized to confuse the searchers. In many instances, the first indication of a tunnel complex will be fire received from a concealed bunker which might otherwise have gone undetected. Spoil from the tunnel system is normally distributed over a wide area, but also may be left in piles close to an entrance or exit and covered by natural growth. Trapdoors are utilized extensively, both at entrances and exits and inside the tunnel complex itself, concealing side tunnels and intermediate sections of a main tunnel. Trapdoors are of several types and are often boobytrapped, thus extreme care must be used when searching for a tunnel.

4. Supply caches:

a. Combat experience has shown that supply caches are the life blood of the enemy offensive. Without caches the enemy's capability to sustain

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Subject: Commander's Notes #8. Finding the Enemy

operations is seriously impaired. Every effort must be made to locate and either destroy or evacuate these supplies. Caches vary in size as to their content, and the unit or operation they support. They are usually well concealed or camouflaged. Accordingly, search operations must be thorough and methodical.

b. The use of information provided by PW's and Hoi Chans can materially assist units in locating caches. Information provided by such people must always be considered and, whenever possible, exploited to the utmost.

c. Caches are normally well concealed, located in the proximity of transportation routes, and are not placed in any discernible patterns. Nipa palm trees have been used by the VC to store equipment. The foliage of these trees offers excellent concealment for caches. Natural and man made anthills have been used as caches for weapons and ammunition. A flock of birds in the area is a good indicator that a cache of rice is nearby. Another common practice is burying supplies under the river bank. The use of probes and mine detectors in locating buried caches has proved to be effective and should be considered in future search operations.

5. This "Commander's Note" treats some of the indicators you must always look for during daily operations. In using these indicators, keep in mind that they may vary in different areas of the division TAOI, and that they may be used singly or collectively. Also remember that these indicators are not all-inclusive. You must be alert to any and all signs of the enemy's presence. I desire that all commanders give their personal attention to the use of these signs in locating the enemy. Good Hunting!

/s/ Orwin C. Talbott  
ORWIN C. TALBOTT  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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